



The Mobile Health Revolution? 
Nathan Cortez* 
Rarely does a class of technologies excite physicians, patients, 
financeers, gadgeteers, and policymakers alike. But mobile health — 
the use of mobile devices like smartphones and tablets for health or 
medical purposes — has captured our collective imagination. 
Observers predict that mobile health, also known as “mHealth” or by 
products called “medical apps,” can save millions of lives, billions in 
spending, and democratize access to health care. Proponents argue that 
mobile health technologies will transform the ways in which we 
deliver, consume, measure, and pay for care, disrupting our sclerotic 
health care system. 
This Article evaluates mobile health and its many ambitions. Given 
the significant hype surrounding mobile health, I try to provide a more 
sober review of the many claims here. I begin by surveying the universe 
of mobile health technologies, offering a typology of products based on 
their functions, many of which have regulatory significance. 
The Article then considers the federal government’s posture towards 
mobile health. To date, Congress and over half a dozen federal 
agencies have addressed these technologies. Contrary to the prevailing 
wisdom, federal regulators are sympathetic, not hostile, to mobile 
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health products. However, I demonstrate how one agency, the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), is repeating the same 
mistakes that it made when it first confronted medical device software 
twenty-five years ago, relying on nonbinding guidance documents that 
are largely weak and unenforceable. I argue that, somewhat 
counterintuitively, mobile health will only reach its immense potential 
if regulators like the FDA provide meaningful oversight. Otherwise, 
users will be flooded with mobile technologies that are ineffective, or 
worse, unsafe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The video begins with the deep, familiar drum of a heartbeat, 
overlaid with piano staccato and flashes of internal organs observable 
only through modern machinery. The narrator begins: “Technology 
has given us an unprecedented view into the human body. But on a 
day-to-day basis, we’re still in the dark about our own health.” 
Staccato gives way to more buoyant notes. “We are changing that.” 
The video continues with three vignettes  all concerned parents 
with young children. In the first, a father uses a smartphone to scan 
his son’s rash, which the phone matches against a database of 
archetypes. The phone advises, “Roseola rash. Recommended action: 
Rest at home.” The father turns to his wife, relieved, “Rest at home. 
It’s okay.” 
In the second vignette, a mother relaxes on her couch with a tablet 
computer, when an alert warns, “Whooping Cough in your area.” The 
tablet recommends a DTaP vaccination for her daughter, which the 
mother schedules with a few taps on the screen. 
In the third vignette, two worried parents use a smartphone to 
measure a 103.8 degree fever in their young daughter. The phone 
prompts for additional symptoms. In response, it recommends a 
urinalysis, which the father performs with peripherals that plug into 
his phone. The software advises “Urinary Tract Infection. Visit Urgent 
Care Now,” displaying a route to the nearest hospital. 
The narrator closes: “We’re building a way for people to check their 
bodies as often as they check their email. It’s all possible. And it’s only 
the beginning.” 
The video is by Scanadu,1 a medical technology company that 
resides at NASA’s Ames Research Center in Silicon Valley.2 Since 2010, 
the company has been trying to create a real life version of the 
Tricorder, the mythical, universal diagnostic device used by Dr. 
McCoy on Star Trek.3 Three years later, Scanadu claims to have done 
 
 1 SCANADU, http://www.scanadu.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2014); see Ivo Clarysse, 
Scanadu Trailer, YOUTUBE (Oct. 11, 2011), http://youtu.be/KSwMauCno6o. 
 2 NASA Research Park: Partners: Scanadu, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., 
http://www.nasa.gov/centers/ames/researchpark/partners/industry/scanadu.html (last 
visited June 24, 2013).  
 3 Indeed, Scanadu has become almost synonymous in the media with efforts to 
develop the Tricorder. See, e.g., Press Mentions, SCANADU, http://www.scanadu.com/ 
press_mentions/ (last visited June 24, 2013) (citing various news article headlines 
likening Scanadu to the Tricorder); see also Mark P. Mills, Tricorder Update: Social 
Medicine Is the Next Big Thing After Social Media, FORBES (May 21, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/markpmills/2012/05/21/tricorder-update-social-medicine-is-
the-next-big-thing-after-social-media/ (calling Scanadu’s innovation a “protean medical 
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so with its first product, the Scout  a small, puck-shaped device that 
measures vital signs like temperature, heart rate, blood oxygenation, 
blood pressure, and what it calls “emotional stress,” when held against 
the forehead.4 The Scout uses various algorithms and sensors, some of 
which derive from NASA’s Mars Curiosity Rover mission.5 Scanadu 
broke fundraising records when it launched a campaign on the 
crowdfunding site Indiegogo.6 It is now soliciting participants for 
usability studies that the company hopes will lead to marketing 
clearance by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”).7 
Scanadu’s marketing line is “Sapere Aude” (“Dare to Know”).8 And its 
website invites users to “[i]magine the tools of an emergency room 
from the comfort of your living room.”9 If successful, the company 
could win a $10 million award from the X Prize Foundation, which in 
2011 created a competition for the first group to create a medical 
Tricorder.10 
In many ways, Scanadu embodies the nascent mobile health 
industry and its boundless ambitions. “Mobile health,” or “mHealth,” 
is the use of mobile communications devices like smartphones and 
tablet computers for health or medical purposes, usually for diagnosis, 
treatment, or simply well-being and maintenance. Most mobile health 
technologies interface with users through applications (“apps”) 
downloaded onto iPhones, iPads, or Android or Windows devices, for 
example. 
 
Tricorder”). See generally Harry McCracken, Scanadu Aims to Turn Smartphones into 
Healthcare Helpers, TIME (Nov. 29, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/11/29/scanadu-
aims-to-turn-smartphones-into-healthcare-helpers/ (describing Scanadu’s features). 
 4 Scanadu Scout, the First Medical Tricorder, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/ 
projects/scanadu-scout-the-first-medical-tricorder?website_name=scanaduscout (last 
visited June 24, 2013) (using the term “emotional stress”); see also Matt Peckham, A Star 
Trek Tricorder? ‘Scanadu Scout’ Health Monitor Surges Past Indiegogo Funding Goal, TIME 
(May 24, 2013), http://ti.me/14Z2QGE; Scanadu Scout, SCANADU, http://www.scanadu. 
com/scout. 
 5 See INDIEGOGO, supra note 4. 
 6 See Ki Mae Heussner, Scanadu’s Medical ‘Tricorder’ Sets Record for Fastest 
Funding Velocity on Indiegogo, GIGAOM (May 24, 2013), http://gigaom.com/2013/05/24/ 
scanadus-medical-tricorder-sets-record-for-fastest-funding-velocity-on-indiegogo/.  
 7 See INDIEGOGO, supra note 4. 
 8 See id. 
 9 SCANADU, supra note 1. 
 10 See Jesse Sunenblick, X Prize: Making the Tricorder a Reality, WIRED (Feb. 17, 
2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2013/02/features/tricorder; QUALCOMM 
TRICORDER X PRIZE, http://www.qualcommtricorderxprize.org/ (last visited June 24, 
2013). 
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In addition to the Scout, we now have technologies that allow us to 
use smartphones to control FDA-regulated devices like blood pressure 
cuffs, ultrasound machines, and insulin pumps. Other mobile health 
apps can link smartphones to hundreds of hospital monitors, allowing 
physicians to track patient vital signs remotely. Some apps allow 
physicians and patients to view CT scans, MRIs, PET scans, and other 
medical images remotely.11 Others allow patients to listen to abnormal 
heart, lung, and bowel sounds, or track their blood-glucose levels 
using their phones. And still others try to turn smartphones into all-
in-one diagnostic tools like the Scout.12 
Some mobile health applications target patient users. Some target 
health care professionals. Many do not discriminate. 
Mobile health applications often take advantage of a smartphone’s 
built-in features, like touch screens, cameras, gyroscopes, lights, 
sounds, and wireless connectivity  as well as software that processes 
interactive questionnaires, algorithms, formulae, calculators, clinical 
decision support tools, and other parameters. Used in combination, 
mobile health applications can generate customized diagnoses and 
treatment recommendations by comparing user-specific data to vast 
bodies of clinical research and accumulated medical knowledge. 
Mobile apps are turning phones into medical devices. 
Mobile health might digitize the ways in which we deliver, 
consume, measure, and pay for health care. Some believe mobile 
health will reduce medical errors, improve quality care, and save 
millions of lives. Others posit that it will save us billions in health 
spending by preventing more serious, acute episodes of illness. Mobile 
health may also decentralize and demystify medicine by shifting the 
locus of care away from expensive medical facilities and professionals, 
and towards digitally-empowered patients. 
Mobile health could provide a much needed shock to the U.S. health 
care system. Smartphones already are replacing stethoscopes and 
pagers as the most ubiquitous physician accessory.13 The number of 
 
 11 “CT” is “computed tomography.” “MRI” is “magnetic resonance imaging.” And 
“PET” is “positron emission tomography.” Each uses different methods to view 
internal organs, structures, and tissues. STEDMAN’S CONCISE MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR 
THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS 236, 636, 751 (4th ed. 2001). 
 12 For a brief snapshot of the history of mobile health devices that connect to other 
medical devices, including many described in this paragraph, see Aditi Pai, Jonah 
Comstock & Brian Dolan, Timeline: Smartphone-Enabled Health Devices, MOBIHEALTHNEWS 
(June 7, 2013), http://mobihealthnews.com/22674/timeline-smartphone-enabled-health-
devices/.  
 13 For a physician’s perspective on this phenomenon, see WILLIAM HANSON, SMART 
MEDICINE: HOW THE CHANGING ROLE OF DOCTORS WILL REVOLUTIONIZE HEALTH CARE 
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smartphone users downloading health applications roughly doubles 
every year, and is expected to hit 500 million by 2015.14 Today, Apple 
offers around 13,000 different health applications for consumers in its 
App Store, not counting the many more targeted at doctors and 
nurses,15 or yet more offered on other device platforms. The $10 
million Tricorder X Prize is but an emblem of the excitement.16 Even 
policymakers see the potential, hoping that mobile health can 
accomplish what has eluded them for decades: the Holy Trinity of 
reducing costs, improving quality, and expanding access to care. 
The mobile health revolution is in many ways the convergence of 
several panoramic trends, including evidence-based medicine, 
personalized medicine, consumer-driven health care, coordinated care, 
pay-for-performance, the “quantified self” movement, and even 
broader evolutions in science, technology, and society.17 In short, 
mobile health sits at the intersection of several converging 
phenomena, and our collective response to it is worth studying.18 
This Article evaluates mobile health and its many possibilities. I 
argue that for mobile health to reach its immense potential, regulators 
must not only try to facilitate these technologies, but also ensure that 
 
19-22 (2011). 
 14 See Elizabeth Orr, 2011 in Review: MDUFA, 510(k) Debate Made List of Top 
News, in DEVICES & DIAGNOSTICS LETTER 2 (Jan. 2, 2012) (citing a study by 
research2guidance). 
 15 See Brian Dolan, Report: 13K iPhone Consumer Health Apps in 2012, 
MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://mobihealthnews.com/13368/report-13k-
iphone-consumer-health-apps-in-2012/.  
 16 See Torie Bosch, Inspired by Star Trek, $10 Million X-Prize Searches for Real-Life 
Tricorder, SLATE (Jan. 10, 2012), http://slate.me/xukOY5 (hoping that the winner’s 
device will “allow a user to diagnose themselves without having to visit a doctor or 
hospital”). For the final guidelines, see Competition Guidelines, QUALCOMM TRICORDER 
X PRIZE (July 1, 2013), http://www.qualcommtricorderxprize.org/competition-
details/competition-guidelines.  
 17 For example, there is a rich literature in the Science, Technology, and Society 
discipline that examines problems related to scientific and technological innovation. 
The scholarship ranges from Thomas Kuhn’s famous 1962 book, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, to work by modern founders like Sheila Jasanoff. Although these 
debates are beyond the scope of this Article, the legal questions I address no doubt 
benefit from their perspectives. 
 18 See Kenneth W. Goodman, Ethical and Legal Issues in Decision Support, in 
CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 137 (Eta S. Berner ed., 2d. 
ed. 2007) (“[T]he debate over medical software regulation represents one of the most 
important controversies of the Computer Age. The balancing of risks and benefits, as 
well as public safety and technological progress, means that scientists, clinicians, and 
policy makers have one of civilization’s most interesting  and challenging  
tasks.”). 
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they are safe and effective. To date, Congress and over half a dozen 
federal agencies, including the FDA, the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”), the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the 
Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, and various 
subagencies of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”), have addressed mobile health.19 
The tenor of their responses, with some exceptions, has been 
optimistic and aspirational. I argue, somewhat counterintuitively, that 
the mobile health market will flourish long-term only if it is subjected 
to a healthy dose of skepticism from federal regulators, particularly the 
FDA. The FDA, and perhaps also the FTC, is in the best position to 
prevent U.S. health policy (and spending) from being dictated by 
“technological solutionism,” the idea that technology can solve any 
and all of our problems, no matter how complicated or persistent.20 
Without meaningful regulatory oversight, users might be flooded with 
mobile technologies that are ineffective, or worse, unsafe. 
I begin in Part I by surveying the universe of mobile health 
technologies and offering a typology of products based on their 
functions. For example, some mobile health apps connect to FDA-
regulated medical devices, amplifying their capabilities. Others 
replicate the functionality of traditional devices. Some automate and 
customize diagnoses or treatment recommendations based on patient-
specific inputs. And others do more. These functions have regulatory 
significance and present discrete benefits and risks. 
Part II then evaluates the many ambitions of mobile health. I 
examine claims that mobile health can save millions of lives, billions 
in spending, and democratize access to medicine. Given the significant 
hype surrounding mobile health, I try to offer a relatively sober, 
dispassionate review of the many claims here.21 
Given these claims, Part III considers the federal government’s 
posture towards mobile health. As noted above, both Congress and 
over half a dozen federal agencies are actively monitoring mobile 
 
 19 See infra Part III. 
 20 See EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM 5-6 (2013). For a critical review by a legal scholar, see Tim 
Wu, Book Review: ‘To Save Everything, Click Here,’ by Evgeny Morozov, WASH. POST (Apr. 
12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/book-review-to-save-everything-
click-here-by-evgeny-morozov/2013/04/12/0e82400a-9ac9-11e2-9a79-eb5280c81c63_ 
story.html (describing “solutionism” as “the idea that deep and serious problems can be 
solved with a few cute apps”). 
 21 The need for more detached, critical evaluations of new Internet technologies 
and their social implications is highlighted, in rather scathing terms, by MOROZOV, 
supra note 20, at 18-20. 
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health technologies. I pay particular attention to the FDA, the agency 
responsible for ensuring that new medical devices are safe and 
effective. I demonstrate that, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, 
federal regulators are sympathetic, not hostile, to mobile health. To 
most observers, this is entirely reasonable. 
However, as I demonstrate in Part IV, the FDA is repeating some of 
the same mistakes that it made when first confronting medical device 
software twenty-five years ago. In 1987, the FDA published a draft 
software guidance,22 partly in response to several deaths caused by the 
first radiation machines operated by software. The FDA then relied on 
the draft guidance for the next eighteen years, withdrawing the policy 
unceremoniously in 2005,23 leaving nothing in its place. The FDA 
never promulgated comprehensive software regulations and never 
even finalized the draft policy. All of this happened during a profound 
computer revolution, no less, when software became increasingly 
ubiquitous and critical to patient safety. 
Likewise, the FDA now relies on nonbinding guidance to explain its 
tentative approach to mobile health, specifying the types of apps that it 
may and may not regulate.24 The agency is thus adopting the same 
posture it did when first confronting medical device software twenty-
five years ago, building on a scaffolding of nonbinding guidance 
documents that are largely unenforceable. I show how recent tragedies 
caused by the latest generation of radiation software echo the same 
problems that first prompted FDA involvement in the mid-1980s. 
Given this evidence, I argue that the FDA should confront its past 
regulatory failures and push itself into a regulatory “feedback loop,” in 
which the agency can identify past shortcomings and correct them 
 
 22 Draft Policy for the Regulation of Computer Products, 52 Fed. Reg. 36,104 
(Sept. 25, 1987); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT POLICY FOR THE REGULATION OF 
COMPUTER PRODUCTS (Nov. 13, 1989), available at 1989 WL 1178702 [hereinafter 
FDA DRAFT SOFTWARE POLICY]. 
 23 Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and Drug 
Administration, 70 Fed. Reg. 824, 890 (Jan. 5, 2005). 
 24 In July 2011, the FDA published a Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical Apps. U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION STAFF: MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS (July 21, 2011) [hereinafter FDA 
DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS], http://www.genomicslawreport.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/FDA-mHealth-Draft-Guidance.pdf; see also Draft Guidance 
for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff; Mobile Medical Applications; 
Availability, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,689 (July 21, 2011). In September 2013, the FDA finalized 
the guidance. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (Sept. 25, 2013) [hereinafter FDA 
FINAL GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM263366.pdf.  
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going forward. For example, if draft guidances become obsolete, the 
agency should update them. And if the FDA declares enforceable 
principles via guidance or elsewhere, it should enforce them. 
For the mobile health revolution to succeed, regulators will need to 
provide genuine oversight, not just cheerleading. 
I. A TYPOLOGY OF MOBILE HEALTH 
The mobile health revolution began on June 29, 2007. On that day, 
Apple released the first iPhone, perhaps “the most anticipated gadget 
of all time.”25 Twenty months later, on stage in front of thousands at 
the World Wide Developer’s Conference, an Apple executive 
connected an iPhone to a blood pressure monitor, and an executive 
from the Johnson & Johnson subsidiary LifeScan connected an iPhone 
to a blood glucose meter.26 The Apple executive observed, “We think 
this is profound.”27 Although mobile health can trace its roots back 
further, to personal digital assistants (“PDAs”), websites like WebMD, 
and even early electronic medical records,28 the first iPhone 
introduced an era of torrential creativity with mobile communications 
devices. 
Barely five years later, and the mobile health revolution is well 
underway. Physicians, nurses, entrepreneurs, financeers, gadgeteers, 
futurists, and even policymakers can barely contain their excitement.29 
Media stories feature breathless quotes about the transformation of 
medicine.30 Part II, below, evaluates these claims. 
But before doing so, Part I introduces mobile health technologies, 
evaluating the first generation of mobile applications and previewing 
later generations that may do much more. I present a typology of 
 
 25 Brian X. Chen, June 29, 2007: iPhone, You Phone, We All Wanna iPhone, WIRED 
(June 29, 2009), http://www.wired.com/thisdayintech/2009/06/dayintech_0629/.  
 26 See Pai et al., supra note 12. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Health 
Care, 13 NEV. L.J. 722 (2013) (tracing the recent history of health information 
technology (“HIT”), beginning with the Institute of Medicine’s call for HIT in 2001 
and continuing on to medical apps). 
 29 See infra Part II. 
 30 See, e.g., Katie Hafner, For a Second Opinion, Consult a Computer?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/health/quest-to-eliminate-diagnostic-
lapses.html (discussing the history of computer-assisted diagnostics and how it has 
evolved); Katie Hafner, Redefining Medicine with Apps and iPads, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/science/redefining-medicine-with-apps-and-ipads-
the-digital-doctor.html?_r=0 (exploring how young doctors are utilizing iPhone apps in 
practice). 
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mobile health applications, categorized largely by their functionality. 
Of course, with an estimated 97,000 mobile health apps on the market 
in 2013,31 any typology will necessarily oversimplify. But the typology 
largely reflects how regulators like the FDA divide the market.32 
Finally, to truly appreciate these technologies, one must see them in 
action, and for that reason I cite to such sources infra. 
A. Connectors 
The first category of applications connects smartphones and tablets 
to FDA-regulated devices, thus amplifying the devices’ functionalities. 
For example, applications now enable clinicians to use their 
smartphones to view and manipulate medical images, analyze 
electroencephalograms (“EEGs”) or electrocardiograms (“ECGs”), 
connect to bedside monitors, screen blood samples, or act as wireless 
remote controls for medical devices.33 
In this latter category, several applications allow users to control 
FDA-regulated devices. Examples include apps that allow users to 
inflate and deflate blood pressure cuffs,34 perform portable 
ultrasounds,35 operate insulin pumps,36 and visually track whether 
wounds heal or regress.37 Other apps also display, analyze, or transmit 
 
 31 See Mobile Health Market Report 2013–2017: The Commercialization of mHealth 
Applications (Vol. 3), RESEARCH2GUIDANCE 7 (Mar. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Report 2013–
2017], http://www.research2guidance.com/shop/index.php/downloadable/download/ 
sample/sample_id/262/.  
 32 See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 18-20. 
 33 See id. at 18 (listing examples). 
 34 See, e.g., Blood Pressure Monitor, WITHINGS, http://withings.com/en/ 
bloodpressuremonitor (last visited June 24, 2013) (displaying blood pressure cuff and 
accompanying blood pressure monitor application); iHealth BPM, ITUNES PREVIEW, 
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/ihealth-bpm/id391469141?mt=8 (last visited June 24, 
2013) (enabling users to monitor their own blood pressure).  
 35 See MOBISANTE, http://www.mobisante.com/ (last visited June 24, 2013) 
(demonstrating and describing the MobiUS SP1 ultrasound imaging system). The FDA 
cleared the MobiUS for marketing in January 2011. See MobiSante, Inc., Section 5 — 
510(k) Summary (FDA Form 510(k)) 3 (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.accessdata.fda. 
gov/cdrh_docs/pdf10/K102153.pdf.  
 36 See OMNIPOD, http://www.myomnipod.com/VPDMweb/index.html (last visited 
June 24, 2013).  
 37 See, e.g., Silhouette Advanced Wound Assessment and Management System, ARANZ 
MED., LTD., http://test.aranzmedical.com/products/silhouette-suite/ (last visited Jan. 1, 
2014) (describing Silhouette, a wound assessment application); Aranz Medical Ltd., 
510(k) Summary of Safety and Effectiveness (FDA Form 510(k)) (Jan. 17, 2007), 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf7/K070426.pdf (document submitted by 
Aranz Medical Ltd. describing Silhouette’s intended uses and features).  
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patient data from an FDA-regulated device. For example, one app 
allows clinicians to use their phones to track patients’ vital signs 
remotely, pulling data “from hundreds of different types of patient 
monitors.”38 A related app allows obstetricians to monitor patients’ 
contractions, fetal heartbeats, and other realtime waveform data.39 Yet 
another allows cardiologists to review and manipulate ECG results 
and histories.40 
Perhaps the most well-known of these is Mobile MIM, which allows 
physicians to view CT scans, MRIs, PET scans, and other diagnostic 
tests on mobile devices.41 Mobile MIM was the first imaging app 
cleared by the FDA, in 2011.42 While physicians use Mobile MIM to 
diagnose patients, its patient version, VueMe, shares the same 
images.43 The apps themselves are free, but the company charges one 
dollar each time the user (again, a physician or patient) uploads or 
sends an image.44 Mobile MIM was available for download from 
iTunes before the FDA had cleared it, but the agency directed the 
company to remove it pending regulatory review.45 The company then 
 
 38 AirStrip Patient Monitoring, ITUNES PREVIEW, http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/ 
airstrip-remote-patient-monitoring/id399665195 (last visited June 24, 2013); see also 
AirStrip ONE Patient Monitoring, AIRSTRIP TECHS., http://www.airstriptech.com (last 
visited June 24, 2013). 
 39 See AirStrip ONE OB, AIRSTRIP TECHS., http://www.airstriptech.com/airstrip-one-
ob (last visited June 24, 2013).  
 40 See The Impact of Airstrip ONE Mobility Across the Cardiology Care Continuum, 
AIRSTRIP TECHS., http://www.airstriptech.com/cardiology/pre-hospital (last visited June 
24, 2013).  
 41 See Press Release, MIM Software, Inc., Mobile MIM, First FDA-Cleared 
Diagnostic Medical Imaging App, Now Available on the U.S. App Store (Feb. 15, 
2011), available at http://www.mimsoftware.com/about/mobilemimpr.  
 42 See Anne Eisenberg, Those Scan Results Are Just an App Away, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/business/medical-apps-to-assist-with-
diagnoses-cleared-by-fda.html; 510(k) Approval Letter from Mary S. Pastel, U.S. Food 
& Drug Admin., to Lynn Hanigan, MIM Software, Inc. (Dec. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf11/K112930.pdf; News Release, U.S. 
Food & Drug Admin., FDA Clears First Diagnostic Radiology Application for Mobile 
Devices (Feb. 4, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ 
PressAnnouncements/2011/ucm242295.htm. “Clearing” a device is different and less 
of an FDA endorsement of its safety and efficacy, than “approving” it through the 
Premarket Approval (“PMA”) process. For a critique of the 510(k) process and the 
lack of scrutiny FDA gives to many medical devices, see INST. OF MED., MEDICAL 
DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 
(July 29, 2011), available at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011/Medical-Devices-and-
the-Publics-Health-The-FDA-510k-Clearance-Process-at-35-Years.aspx.  
 43 See Eisenberg, supra note 42. 
 44 See id. (noting the charge is $2 for iPad users). 
 45 See Vernessa T. Pollard & Chandra Branham, FDA Medical Device Requirements: 
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spent two and a half years and roughly $150,000 obtaining the FDA’s 
blessing.46 The FDA initially was concerned that physicians would 
struggle to make accurate diagnoses while viewing images in bright 
environments (particularly outdoors), as opposed to the traditional 
approach of viewing images on large dedicated screens in dimly-lit 
rooms.47 In response, Mobile MIM developed a feature to 
automatically detect subpar lighting conditions.48 The Mobile MIM 
story is both a cautionary tale and a success story for app developers. 
B. Replicators 
A second class of apps turns the smartphone or tablet itself into a 
medical device by replicating the functionality of an FDA-regulated 
device. For example, several apps use attachments or sensors to send 
data directly to the smartphone, which then processes and displays the 
results, and perhaps even recommends diagnoses or treatment 
options. These apps allow users to connect, for example, to blood 
glucose monitors, stethoscopes, or ECG or EEG machines.49 Others 
might use the phone’s built-in microphone “to amplify heart, lung, 
blood vessel, enteral, and other body sounds.”50 Still others might use 
built-in features like accelerometers to measure a patient’s body 
movement or heart rate.51 More and more apps are engaging stock 
features like lights, vibrations, and cameras for medical uses.52 
Within this class, several cardiology apps replicate traditional device 
functions and demonstrate the possibilities (and perils) here. For 
example, iStethoscope Expert uses the iPhone’s built-in microphone to 
record sounds emanating from the heart, lungs, and bowels.53 It 
includes a Heart Murmur Interpreter, a Lung Sounds Interpreter, and a 
Bowel Sounds Interpreter. The Heart Murmur Interpreter, for 
 
A Legal Framework for Regulating Health Information Technology, Software, and Mobile 
Apps, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FOOD AND DRUG LAW, 2011 ED., at *9 (2011), 
available at 2011 WL 5833341. 
 46 See Olga Kharif, Mobile Health Apps Arrive, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 29, 
2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/mobile-health-apps-arrive-09292011. 
html.  
 47 See Eisenberg, supra note 42. 
 48 See id. 
 49 See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 19 (listing 
examples). 
 50 Id. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See iStethoscope Expert, ITUNES PREVIEW, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/ 
istethoscope-expert-heart/id651962198?mt=8 (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).  
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example, instructs the user to place the microphone against the chest, 
then answer a series of questions like, “Where is the murmur the 
loudest on the chest?” “Is the murmur a systolic murmur?” and “Is the 
murmur a diasystolic [sic] murmur?” It then generates what it calls a 
“diagnosis.” For a test run, selecting the first answer in response to 
each of the five questions generates a diagnosis of hypertrophic 
cardiomyopathy, which, the app explains, can cause sudden cardiac 
death in younger patients during exertion.54 
A similar app by AliveCor made waves when videos went viral of a 
doctor turning an iPhone into a cardiac event monitor.55 AliveCor uses 
a slim iPhone case with two silver electrodes on the outside, which 
users hold in their hand or press against the chest. The iPhone’s screen 
then displays the familiar peaks and valleys of a heartbeat. The video 
proclaims that the app “turns the iPhone 4 into a wireless, clinical 
quality cardiac event monitor.”56 The video also claims that the app 
can offer “an immediate diagnosis.”57 In 2012, the company was 
preparing to submit clinical trial results to the FDA.58 
Other cardiac apps rely on more traditional recorders. For example, 
in 2011, the FDA cleared the Reka E100 app, which transmits events 
recorded by a peripheral cardiac event recording device.59 The app 
sends recordings from the event monitor to a monitoring center, 
which is then evaluated by a cardiologist. The company’s submission 
to the FDA carefully noted that the Reka E100 is not a “conventional 
diagnostic tool.”60 
Similar apps appear in the diabetes field. The iBGStar Diabetes 
Manager app connects iPhones directly to a separate blood glucose 
 
 54 For a demonstration, see Nathan Cortez, Medical Apps, Disruptive Innovation, 
and Regulatory Timing, AM. SOC’Y OF LAW, MED., & ETHICS (2012), available at 
http://prezi.com/arr5dspyjaww/medical-apps-disruptive-innovation-and-regulatory-
timing/ (last visited June 24, 2013).  
 55 See Brian Dolan, iPhone ECG developer AliveCor raises $3 million, 
MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Aug. 2, 2011), http://mobihealthnews.com/12224/iphone-ecg-
developer-alivecor-raises-3-million; AliveCor, Inc., AliveCor — How It All Started — 
The Original Dr. Dave iPhone ECG Video, YOUTUBE (May 7, 2013), http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=aDnGXzwIJBc (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).  
 56 See AliveCor, Inc., supra note 55.  
 57 See id.  
 58 See Timothy Hay, AliveCor Raises $10.5M as Smartphone Heart Monitor Ends 
Trials, DOWJONES VENTUREWIRE (June 11, 2012), http://pevc.dowjones.com/Article?an= 
DJFVW00020120611e86bawgva&ReturnUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fpevc.dowjones.com% 
3A80%2FArticle%3Fan%3DDJFVW00020120611e86bawgva.  
 59 See REKA Pte. Ltd., 510(k) Summary (FDA Form 510(k)) 2-3 (Sept. 12, 2011), 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf11/K111438.pdf. 
 60 Id. at 2. 
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monitoring system.61 Together, the app and the monitor allow patients 
to track their blood glucose levels and send results to physicians.62 
iBGStar presents data in multiple formats and even alerts users when 
their blood sugar levels are too high or too low. An iBGStar meter was 
associated with two adverse events reported to the FDA in March 
2012, although it was unclear if users were also using the app.63 
Some replicator apps are even more ambitious. For example, the 
BioZen app claims it can receive realtime feedback from several 
biosensor devices, like EEGs, ECGs, electromyographies (“EMGs”), 
galvanic skin responses (“GSRs”), respirators, and thermometers.64 
BioZen is unique in that it has been endorsed by the U.S. Department 
of Defense for improving the mental health of military personnel.65 
Notably, the BioZen web-site says, “These devices and BioZen are not 
designed or intended for psychological therapy or medical 
treatments.”66 Nevertheless, many apps are now trying to replicate the 
functions of conventional medical devices. 
C. Automators and Customizers 
Notwithstanding its disclaimers, BioZen blurs the line between apps 
that replicate medical device functions and apps that also use patient 
data to generate custom diagnoses or treatment recommendations. 
This third category of apps uses questionnaires, algorithms, formulae, 
medical calculators, or other software parameters to aid clinical 
decisions. As such, these apps are part of a broader universe of clinical 
 
 61 See iBGStar Diabetes Manager Application, IBGSTAR, http://www.ibgstar.us/ 
iphone-app.aspx (last visited June 24, 2013).  
 62 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 510(K) SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE DETERMINATION, 
DECISION SUMMARY 2 (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/ 
reviews/K103544.pdf; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 510(K) SUMMARY — AGAMATRIX, INC. 2 
(Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf10/K103544.pdf.  
 63 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MAUDE ADVERSE EVENT REPORT: AGAMATRIX, 
INC., IBGSTAR BGMS BLOOD GLUCOSE METER (Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.accessdata. 
fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfmaude/detail.cfm?mdrfoi__id=2603027; U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., MAUDE ADVERSE EVENT REPORT: AGAMATRIX, INC., IBGSTAR BGMS BLOOD 
GLUCOSE METER (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/ 
cfmaude/detail.cfm?mdrfoi__id=2577874.  
 64 See BioZen, NAT’L CTR. FOR TELEHEALTH & TECH., http://www.t2health.org/apps/ 
biozen (last visited June 24, 2013).  
 65 See id. 
 66 BioZen, GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.t2&hl=en 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2014). The FDA says that it plans to address apps that analyze, 
process, or interpret data from multiple medical devices in a separate guidance. FDA 
DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 15. 
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decision support software.67 The apps can, for example, automate tasks 
for physicians, such as calculating an Apgar Score for newborns, or 
determining the precise dose of blood thinner, anesthesia, or 
chemotherapy for patients based on their age, weight, and other 
inputs.68 As noted above, iStethoscope Expert features this 
functionality via its questionnaire, demonstrating how the categorical 
lines blur. Another example is Depression Journal, an iPhone app that 
allows users to track when they are depressed and identify potential 
triggers.69 It once claimed that the app is “a valuable tool for 
Depression Trends Analysis to get additional insights about triggers 
and how to avoid them.”70 
A related species of apps that may hold the most promise of 
decentralizing and demystifying medicine is the all-in-one diagnostic 
tool, like Pocket Doctor, Caracal Diagnosis, Diagnosis Pro, and 
WebMD’s Symptom Checker. These apps are proliferating. A search 
for “diagnosis” in the App Store generates 275 iPad apps and 509 
iPhone apps.71 These programs typically allow users to key in 
symptoms and even laboratory values, which feed into an algorithm 
that generates potential diagnoses, usually ordered by probability. For 
example, entering “chest pain” and “lightheadedness” into Caracal 
generates 119 possible diagnoses and 15 “high probabilities.” Caracal 
differentiates high-probability from low-probability diagnoses by color 
(red to green). 
Many apps simultaneously promise great things and then disclaim 
their accuracy, urging users to seek advice from medical 
professionals.72 Notably, many customizer apps generally target 
 
 67 Clinical decision support software is drawing increased attention from scholars. 
See, e.g., Amanda Swanson & Fazal Khan, The Legal Challenge of Incorporating 
Artificial Intelligence into Medical Practice, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 90 (2012) 
(discussing how health providers have increasingly turned to such technology as it has 
become more affordable and reliable). 
 68 See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 19-20. 
 69 See Depression Journal, IHEALTH VENTURES, http://www.ihealthventures.com/ 
app_details.php?aid=34824 (last visited June 24, 2013).  
 70 Id. (note that the description has since changed). 
 71 Search conducted on January 26, 2014.  
 72 For example, the Caracal app disclaims that: “Caracal is a clinical decision 
support system. It cannot guarantee the accuracy of the diagnoses and please note that 
you are solely responsible for any decisions you take based on the information 
contained in it.” Husam Salhab, Caracal Diagnosis: Smart Medical Diseases Search 
Engine, ITUNES PREVIEW, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/caracal-diagnosis-smart-
medical/id529633939?mt=8 (accessed on Aug. 9, 2013) (note that as of December 9, 
2013, the disclaimer was updated to read, “Please note that Caracal is only a 
differential diagnosis tool and isn’t supposed to give you any further information 
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medical professionals and students, though nothing prevents lay users 
from downloading them. Like other medical innovations, the message 
is often “caveat emptor.”73 Yet, these all-in-one tools may represent the 
primordial beginnings of the Tricorder. 
D. Informers and Educators 
A broad fourth category includes medical reference texts and 
educational apps that primarily aim to inform and educate. For 
example, hundreds of apps replicate medical textbooks, references, or 
teaching aids. Trusted sources like the Physician’s Desk Reference, the 
Merck Manual, and Gray’s Anatomy have been converted into app 
format.74 Many medical journals now present themselves in app format 
as well, including the New England Journal of Medicine (“NEJM”), 
the Journal of the American Medical Association (“JAMA”), the 
Journal of Clinical Oncology, and The Lancet.75 As a godsend to 
medical students, hundreds of apps replicate flash cards, quizzes, and 
other exam review materials, enhanced by touch controls and other 
interactive features on modern smartphones and tablets.76 
 
regarding medical conditions”). Similarly, the Pocket Doctor app disclaims, “Pocket 
Doctor cannot guarantee the accuracy of the diagnoses. You use it at your own risk.” 
Pocket App Ltd., Pocket Doctor Lite, ITUNES PREVIEW, https://itunes.apple.com/ 
us/app/pocket-doctor-lite/id520802051?mt=8 (accessed on Aug. 9, 2013) (note that 
the description has since changed). 
 73 See Nathan Cortez, Recalibrating the Legal Risks of Cross-Border Health Care, 10 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 18-19 (2010). 
 74 See AP Tech. Holdings, LLC, The Merck Manual Professional Edition, ITUNES 
PREVIEW, http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/merck-manual-professional/id331016312 (last 
visited June 24, 2013); Elsevier Inc., Gray’s Anatomy for Students for iPad, ITUNES 
PREVIEW, http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/grays-anatomy-for-students/id429405125 (last 
visited June 24, 2013); Skyscape, mobilePDR for Prescribers, ITUNES PREVIEW, 
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/mobilepdr-for-prescribers/id382594350 (last visited June 
24, 2013).  
 75 See About NEJM Mobile, NEW ENG. J. MED., http://www.nejm.org/page/about-
nejm/mobile-applications (last visited Feb. 8, 2014); About the Lancet iPad Application, 
LANCET, http://www.thelancet.com/ipad (last visited June 24, 2013); HighWire Press 
& Stanford University, The Journal of Clinical Oncology, ITUNES PREVIEW, 
https://itunes.apple.com/gb/app/journal-of-clinical-oncology/id465016976?mt=8 (last 
visited June 24, 2013); The JAMA Network, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://mobile. 
jamanetwork.com/ (last visited June 24, 2013) (linking to JAMA’s app, which features 
the Journal and nine specialty journals).  
 76 See, e.g., Elsevier Inc., Netter’s Anatomy Atlas Free, ITUNES PREVIEW, 
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/netters-anatomy-atlas-free/id457575880 (last visited 
June 24, 2013) (providing an example of an application that has quizzing and 
customization features).  
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These apps largely represent digital versions of print sources  or 
sources that otherwise might have been printed in bygone eras. They 
do not concern the FDA or other regulators much, as their print 
counterparts would fall outside of FDA jurisdiction.77 Still, informer 
and educator apps are worth noting, as they seem to comprise a robust 
portion of the reported 97,000 mobile health apps on the market in 
2013.78 
E. Administrators 
Other, more mundane apps automate office functions, like 
identifying appropriate insurance billing codes or scheduling patient 
appointments.79 These represent the mobile evolution of practice 
management software. Such apps are “medical” insofar as they are 
used by medical providers, not because they perform any medical 
functions per se. Yet, at some point these apps might become more 
ambitious. For example, a scheduling app logically might administer 
pre-appointment patient questionnaires, then flag certain patients for 
specific diagnostic tests based on their answers. Such a feature would 
bring administrative apps closer to clinical decision support software, 
which I categorize above as automators or customizers. Again, these 
categories will be transient for apps that evolve. 
F. Loggers and Trackers 
A final, more interesting cluster of apps allows users to log, record, 
and make decisions about their general health and wellness. This 
group includes diet trackers, calorie counters, exercise regimens, and 
the like. They may integrate alarms, timers, reminders, and other 
interactive features. Others try to “gamify” health care by using game-
like rewards systems, point-tracking, and challenges to encourage 
healthier behavior.80 These apps represent another innovative frontier 
 
 77 See FDA DRAFT SOFTWARE POLICY, supra note 22, at *1. 
 78 See RESEARCH2GUIDANCE, Report 2013–2017, supra note 31, at 7. 
 79 For example, a search conducted on December 29, 2013 for “ICD” in the App 
Store (short for International Classification of Diseases, the World Health 
Organization’s coding system commonly used by insurers) generates 135 iPad apps 
and 194 iPhone apps. 
 80 In fact, there is a new academic journal dedicated to studying the “gamification” 
of health care, the Games for Health Journal. See Brian Edwards, Gamification of 
Healthcare Gets Its Due Recognition from Academic Elite, IMEDICALAPPS (Aug. 19, 2011), 
http://www.imedicalapps.com/2011/08/gamification-healthcare-due-recognition-
academic-elite/; Games for Health Journal, LIEBERT OPEN ACCESS, http://online. 
liebertpub.com/loi/G4H (last visited June 24, 2013).  
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for health care, even though they generally do not concern the FDA  
as long as they do not try to diagnose, cure, treat, mitigate, or prevent 
specific, identifiable diseases or conditions.81 
But herein lays the gray area. Many health and wellness apps do 
address themselves to specific diseases or conditions. An important 
subset of these includes apps offered by FDA-regulated firms, like 
pharmaceutical, biotech, and medical device companies.82 Loggers and 
trackers may also automate knowledge contained in medical literature 
and clinical studies to educate users and guide their decisions. The 
FDA notes that such apps could meet the statutory definition of 
medical “devices,” but intends to monitor these apps without 
regulating them at the moment.83 European regulators are also 
debating whether pharmaceutical apps qualify as medical devices 




A final observation worth emphasizing is that any taxonomy of 
mobile health technologies will be suggestive rather than definitive. 
Apps that today inform and educate may add logging or tracking 
features. Loggers and trackers may evolve into customizers, 
replicators, or connectors. These apps are subject to frequent updates. 
Indeed, part of the appeal of software is that it is easy to change. But it 
also marks a significant departure from more traditional medical 
devices. 
II. THE PROMISE OF MOBILE HEALTH 
These first-generation apps should evolve into more sophisticated, 
capable iterations that might change how we deliver, consume, 
 
 81 See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 11. 
 82 For example, the website Pocket.MD tracks mobile apps offered by 
pharmaceutical, biotech, and medical device companies. As of January 2014, it counts 
at least 1,378 such apps, including those offered by Amgen, Medtronic, Pfizer, and 
other industry leaders. All Apps, POCKET.MD, http://www.pocket.md/applications.html 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2014).  
 83 See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 11-12 & 
n.13. 
 84 See, e.g., James Sherwin-Smith & Rowan Pritchard-Jones, Medical Applications: 
The Future of Regulation, 94 BULL. OF ROYAL COLL. OF SURGEONS OF ENG. 12 (2012) 
(considering the legal status of medical apps under the European Union Medical 
Devices Directive). 
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measure, and pay for health care. As the mobile health market begins 
to mature, it is worth pausing to evaluate these possibilities. 
As an initial matter, both the trajectory of mobile health users and 
the value of the market are impressive. For example, the number of 
medical apps created for Apple devices more than doubled in just one 
year, jumping from roughly 800 in 2010 to 2,000 in 2011  not even 
counting apps for other platforms, like Android and Blackberry.85 The 
number of people accessing health data on their phones increased 
125% between 2010 and 2012, to roughly 17 million.86 The number of 
users that downloaded mobile health apps nearly doubled in just one 
year, from 124 million in 2011 to 247 million in 2012.87 By 2015, 
industry observers predict that 500 million smartphone users will use 
mobile health apps.88 
The value of the medical app market has risen correspondingly, 
from $718 million in 2011 to an estimated $1.3 billion in 2012.89 The 
broader mobile health industry may be worth anywhere from $2 
billion to $6 billion by 2015.90 Another estimate predicts that by 2018, 
the market will generate $26 billion in revenues.91 
On a broader scale, there has been a rapid diffusion of smartphones, 
tablets, and other mobile devices, which seems to be accelerating 
rather than abating. By 2018, there may be 3.4 billion unique 
smartphones and tablets capable of downloading mobile health apps, 
about half of which are predicted to do so.92 Today, more people 
worldwide have access to mobile phone service (5.7 billion) than to 
 
 85 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Public Workshop — Mobile Medical 
Applications Draft Guidance, Transcript (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter FDA Public 
Workshop], http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/ 
ucm267821.htm (statement by Brian Dolan of MobiHealth News).  
 86 See FCC, COMM’N DOC., CHAIRMAN PROPOSAL TO SPUR INNOVATION IN MEDICAL 
BODY AREA NETWORKS 2 (May 17, 2012) [hereinafter CHAIRMAN PROPOSAL], 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-314146A1.pdf.  
 87 See Ralf-Gordon Jahns, U.S. $1.3 Billion: The Market for mHealth Applications in 
2012, RESEARCH2GUIDANCE (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.research2guidance.com/. 
 88 See Orr, supra note 14, at 2. 
 89 See Jahns, supra note 87.  
 90 See FCC, CHAIRMAN PROPOSAL, supra note 86, at 2 (citing Healthcare 
Information and Management Systems Society). 
 91 See RESEARCH2GUIDANCE, Report 2013–2017, supra note 31, at 7. In 2011, a 
London-based research company predicted that the market would generate $11.8 
billion in revenues by 2018. Brian Dolan, Global Mobile Health Market Now Worth 
$11.8B by 2018, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Aug. 6, 2012), http://mobihealthnews.com/18159/ 
global-mobile-health-market-now-worth-11-8b-by-2018/.  
 92 See RESEARCH2GUIDANCE, Report 2013–2017, supra note 31, at 7. 
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basic sanitation (4.4 billion).93 Mobile phones are creating new 
possibilities in developing countries in particular for mobile banking 
and mobile health.94 
If we are truly on the cusp of a mobile health revolution, several 
groups are trying to accelerate it. In 2011, the X Prize Foundation and 
Qualcomm announced a $10 million prize for the first group to create 
a real-life Tricorder  the futuristic, all-purpose, handheld medical 
diagnostic tool used by Dr. McCoy in Star Trek.95 According to the 
contest guidelines, the winning device must “allow a user to diagnose 
themselves without having to visit a doctor or hospital.”96 The 
guidelines encapsulate the aspirations for mobile health, which is 
nothing short of “major disruption to global health care systems.”97 
The following sections evaluate the three major ambitions of mobile 
health: to improve the quality of health care and reduce medical 
errors; to reduce the cost of health care; and to increase access to care 
by democratizing and demystifying medicine. 
A. Improve Quality 
A primary aspiration of mobile health is to reduce medical errors, 
improve quality care, and save lives. One idea is that mobile 
monitoring will allow us to gather more granular health data on 
patients, and in shorter, more frequent intervals. Patients and 
 
 93 See FDA Public Workshop, supra note 85 (statement of Robert Jarrin, 
Qualcomm, Inc.). 
 94 See, e.g., Marc J. Epstein & Eric G. Bing, Delivering Health Care to the Global 
Poor: Solving the Accessibility Problem, 6 INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, 
GLOBALIZATION 117 (2011) (discussing how technology, including the use of mobile 
phones, has revolutionized health care in the developing world); James G. Kahn, 
Joshua S. Yang & James S. Kahn, ‘Mobile’ Health Needs and Opportunities in Developing 
Countries, 29 HEALTH AFF. 254 (2010) (analyzing various mhealth applications in 
developing countries at the large geographic area level, community level, and 
individual level); Terje Aksel Sanner, Lars Kristian Roland & Kristin Braa, From Pilot 
to Scale: Towards an mHealth Typology for Low-Resource Contexts, 1 HEALTH POL’Y & 
TECH. 155 (2012) (providing an analysis of the use of mobile phones in the Health 
Information System in low-resource settings); Symposium, Mobile Money in Developing 
Countries: Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 155 
(2013) (presenting articles about the use of mobile phones in developing countries for 
banking and the creation of financial institutions). 
 95 See Bosch, supra note 16. 
 96 See id. (citing tweet by Dr. Peter Diamandis, Chairman and CEO of X Prize 
Foundation). Final guidelines for this competition were published in September 2012, 
but have been updated in 2013. See generally Competition Guidelines, supra note 16 
(containing the full details about the Competition). 
 97 Competition Guidelines, supra note 16, at 61. 
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providers can then use this data to better tailor care, to better 
coordinate care, and to avoid duplicative or unnecessary care. For 
example, hospitals can use networked devices to monitor inpatients or 
even discharged patients, particularly those managing chronic 
conditions.98 Mobile technologies might then process this data to alert 
patients and physicians of sudden (or even gradual) changes for the 
worse. Constant monitoring might give providers more lead-time to 
respond to life-threatening conditions, or even predict them ahead of 
time, and could reduce hospital readmission rates.99 
The intuitive appeal of mobile technologies is that they might 
leverage massive amounts of clinical research data and experience, 
embodying the ideals of empirical, “evidence-based medicine.”100 Data-
driven technologies could help physicians and hospitals better 
coordinate care, and empower patients to better manage their own 
health, particularly chronic conditions. Medical apps could, in theory, 
improve the quality of all types of care  preventative and primary, 
acute and tertiary. 
Yet, despite the ambition to reduce medical errors and improve 
quality, a recent study found that many medical apps “do not follow 
established medical guidelines.”101 For example, a 2011 study of forty-
seven different smoking cessation apps found that they followed very 
few of the evidence-based clinical practice guidelines for smoking 
cessation programs, like combining pharmacotherapy and 
counseling.102 A review of 137 diabetes apps found “obvious gaps 
between the evidence-based recommendations and the 
 
 98 For a description of the possibilities with Medical Body Area Networks 
(MBANs), see FCC, CHAIRMAN PROPOSAL, supra note 86. 
 99 See id. at 1. 
 100 “Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is the process of basing clinical 
decisionmaking on the best available objective and unbiased medical research, which 
generally means information gained from randomized controlled clinical trials or 
systematic reviews of data from multiple trials.” Swanson & Khan, supra note 67, at 
110; see also Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Healthcare 
Reform: An Update, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 21, 21 (2012). For a historical evaluation of 
the ambitions of evidence-based medicine and clinical practice guidelines, as related to 
legal battles over physician standards of care, including its recent resurgence, see 
Maxwell J. Mehlman, Professional Power and the Standard of Care in Medicine, 44 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 1165 (2012). 
 101 Rochelle Sharpe, Lacking Regulation, Many Medical Apps Questionable at Best, 
NEW ENG. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Nov. 18, 2012), http://necir-bu.org/ 
investigations/medical-apps/.  
 102 See Lorien C. Aroms et al., iPhone Apps for Smoking Cessation: A Content 
Analysis, 40 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 279, 279-85 (2011), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3395318/.  
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functionality . . . found in online markets.”103 In fact, various reviews 
find that many mobile health apps either ignore or contradict 
evidence-based guidelines, are not supported by scientific research, or 
are not even developed with the input of a medical professional.104 
A Boston University study examined 1,500 mobile health apps, and 
found that over 20% (331) “claim[] to treat or cure medical 
problems.”105 Almost half of these rely on a smartphone’s stock 
features (like lights, sound, or vibration) to produce a therapeutic 
effect.106 Yet, the study found a near consensus among scientific and 
medical experts that smartphones cannot deliver lights or sounds in 
therapeutic doses, particularly for the conditions being targeted.107 For 
example, the iSAD app claims to treat seasonal affective disorder 
(“SAD”) and depression, instructing customers to use the app for 15 
to 45 minutes each day with the iPhone screen adjusted for maximum 
brightness.108 But the iPhone emits a maximum of only 200 lux, while 
light therapy to treat SAD requires ten times that amount (2,000 lux) 
during a two-hour session.109 The app is careful to disclaim, “The iSAD 
Lamp is meant for entertainment purposes.”110 
Similarly, the Boston University study found that sound therapy 
apps have very little scientific or medical research to support their 
claims.111 For example, the A.G.Method app, which sells for $9.99, 
 
 103 Taridzo Chomutare et al., Features of Mobile Diabetes Applications: Review of the 
Literature and Analysis of Current Applications Compared Against Evidence-Based 
Guidelines, 13 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 65 (2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih. 
gov/pmc/articles/PMC3222161/.  
 104 See, e.g., Pamela Lewis Dolan, What’s Missing from Many Health Apps — Medical 
Expertise, AM. MED. NEWS (May 13, 2013), http://www.amednews.com/article/ 
20130513/business/130519995/6/ (citing an unpublished study of 222 pain-related 
smartphone apps); Benjamin A. Rosser & Christopher Eccleston, Smartphone 
Applications for Pain Management, 17 J. TELEMEDICINE & TELECARE 308 (2011), 
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21844177 (examining 111 pain-
related apps on five major platforms); Sharpe, supra note 101 (studying 1,500 paid 
apps). 
 105 Sharpe, supra note 101. The Center investigated “apps that cost money and 
have been available since June 2011.” The Center found a range of prices between “69 
cents to $999.” 
 106 See id. 
 107 See id. 
 108 See id.; Comtek, iSAD Lamp, ITUNES PREVIEW, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/ 
isad-lamp/id389744890?mt=8 (last visited June 18, 2013).  
 109 See Sharpe, supra note 101 (citing two leading researchers on seasonal affective 
disorder, including the pioneer of light therapy). 
 110 Id.; Comtek, supra note 108. 
 111 See Sharpe, supra note 101. 
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claims to use “sonic induction” to treat pain.112 In the company’s 
words: “This Application helps you to quickly and easily relieve 
everyday pain such as insomnia, headache, toothache, minor muscle 
aches and other general pains. A.G.Method App has been completely 
tested and verified as safe, efficacious, and effective.”113 Again, experts 
reacted with deep skepticism about these claims. In one reviewer’s 
opinion: “There is no plausible, physiologic way in which something 
like this would help.”114 
Thus, in these early, evolutionary phases of mobile health, some 
aspire to harness evidence-based medicine to enable higher quality, 
better tailored, and better coordinated care, with fewer mistakes. But 
at the other end of the spectrum, many apps are the equivalent of 
“digital snake oil.”115 The problem is that consumers (both patients 
and professionals alike) may have trouble distinguishing the two.116 
B. Reduce Spending 
A second aspiration for mobile health is to reduce our profligate 
spending. A recurrent theme in the writing on mobile health  be it 
academic, business, government, media, or medical  is that mobile 
technologies can economize in a number of ways, typically by 
preventing more acute, expensive episodes of care. For example, 
mobile technologies could reduce the number of hospital visits, 
physician visits, and other expensive face-to-face consultations.117 
Mobile apps might also enable us to better manage chronic diseases, 
which account for roughly 75% of all U.S. health spending.118 
 
 112 A.G. Method, AGMethod, ITUNES PREVIEW, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/ 
agmethod/id422329655?mt=8 (last visited June 18, 2013); see Sharpe, supra note 101. 
 113 A.G. Method, supra note 112. 
 114 Sharpe, supra note 101 (quoting Satish Misra, physician and managing editor of 
the website iMedicalApps). 
 115 Carl Franzen, Side Effects May Vary: The Growing Problem of Unregulated 
Medical Apps, VERGE (June 3, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/3/ 
4380244/how-should-medical-apps-be-regulated.  
 116 See Lex van Velsen et al., Why Mobile Health App Overload Drives Us Crazy, and 
How to Restore the Sanity, 13 BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION MAKING 23 (2013), 
available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/13/23.  
 117 See FCC, COMM’N DOC., CHAIRMAN GENACHOWSKI HOSTS MHEALTH SUMMIT 3 
(June 6, 2012) [hereinafter CHAIRMAN GENACHOWSKI], http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-314487A1.pdf.  
 118 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CHRONIC DISEASES: THE POWER TO 
PREVENT, THE CALL TO CONTROL (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/resources/ 
publications/aag/chronic.htm.  
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Several estimates predict concrete savings through mobile health. 
For example, one estimate predicts that using disposable wireless 
sensors to detect hospital-acquired infections early could save up to 
$12,000 per patient, or $11 billion per year.119 Another calculates $10 
billion in annual savings from using mobile technologies to remotely 
monitor patients with congestive heart failure.120 And a 2008 study 
suggested that using mobile technologies to monitor just four 
common chronic conditions could save us $197 billion over twenty-
five years.121 Studies even predict that mobile technologies can help 
cut our health care system’s considerable administrative costs.122 
The vast majority of medical apps are either free or very inexpensive 
(in the one to five dollar range). And anything that shifts the locus of 
care away from expensive professionals, facilities, and insurance 
systems could save us significant money. Although we have long 
suspected that indiscriminately adopting new technologies (many with 
marginal benefits over the old) contributes to higher health care 
spending,123 mobile health could buck this trend. 
Policymakers have also been quick to jump on the cost-saving 
bandwagon. For example, FCC chairman Julius Genachowski has 
made repeated public remarks that mobile technologies can save 
billions in health care spending.124 Members of Congress repeat this 
refrain, noting blithely that “[i]nnovative wireless medical devices play 
 
 119 See FCC, CHAIRMAN PROPOSAL, supra note 86, at 2. 
 120 See id. 
 121 See Robert E. Litan, Vital Signs via Broadband: Remote Health Monitoring 
Transmits Savings, Enhances Lives, BETTER HEALTH CARE TOGETHER 1, 2 (Oct. 24, 2008), 
http://www.corp.att.com/healthcare/docs/litan.pdf. 
 122 See, e.g., Connected Life: The Impact of the Connected Life over the Next Five Years, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 1, 7-8 (2013), http://www.gsma.com/connectedliving/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/GSMA-Connected-Life-PwC_Feb-2013.pdf (predicting that 
mHealth might cut health spending in OECD nations by $400 billion in 2017, 
including 20-30% savings in hospital administrative expenses); The Socio-Economic 
Impact of Mobile Health, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP 7 (2012), http://www.telenor. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/BCG-Telenor-Mobile-Health-Report-May-2012.pdf 
(predicting administrative savings of 20-30%). In fact, a recent bill proposed in 
Congress would push federal health care programs to examine how wireless health 
information technologies could save on federal program expenses. H.R. 3577, 113th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).  
 123 For an account almost twenty years ago, see Alan M. Garber, Can Technology 
Assessment Control Health Spending?, 13 HEALTH AFF. 115 (1994). 
 124 See FCC, CHAIRMAN GENACHOWSKI, supra note 117; FCC, CHAIRMAN PROPOSAL 
supra note 86, at 1. 
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a vital role in addressing our nation’s unsustainable health care 
costs.”125 
Of course, for all this to be true, these technologies must work. 
Apps of the “digital snake oil” variety126 will squander rather than save 
money. The likely outcome is that some mobile technologies will 
economize while others either have no affect or even raise spending. 
The question, then, is what net economic effect mobile health care will 
have on overall spending. 
C. Democratize Medicine 
A third, related aspiration for mobile health is to decentralize, 
demystify, and democratize medicine. Many mobile health 
technologies allow patients to closely monitor their own health, which 
should increase patient engagement. Patients thus equipped might be 
less reliant on the bottleneck of information and advice generated by 
medical professionals, facilities, and even payors. Mobile health 
aspires to shift the locus of care away from these more established, 
expensive institutions, and towards individual patients. Indeed, 
decentralizing and democratizing access to health information and 
self-diagnostic tools is a core theme of the “disruption” literature, 
which sees medical apps and other health information technologies 
fundamentally transforming health care in the near future.127 
When viewed more broadly, mobile health is part of broader 
cultural and technological evolutions, including the march towards 
more personalized medicine,128 the “quantified self” movement,129 the 
 
 125 Letter from Representatives Marsha Blackburn et al., to Margaret Hamburg, 
FDA Comm’r, and Julius Genachowski, FCC Chairman (Apr. 3, 2012), available at 
http://blackburn.house.gov/uploadedfiles/letter_from_congress_to_fda_and_fcc_-_ 
3apr2012.pdf.  
 126 See Franzen, supra note 115. See generally Nathan Cortez, The FDA Needs to 
Regulate “Digital Snake Oil,” SLATE (Sept. 24, 2013, 3:59 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
blogs/future_tense/2013/09/24/mhealth_fda_needs_to_regulate_digital_snake_oil.html 
(discussing what the FDA has done to regulate health apps, and what it must do in the 
future to encourage high quality innovation). 
 127 See, e.g., CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, JEROME H. GROSSMAN & JASON HWANG, THE 
INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION: A DISRUPTIVE SOLUTION FOR HEALTH CARE 313-20 (2009) 
(describing alternating waves of decentralization and centralization in the medical 
device and diagnostic industry). But see Terry, supra note 28, at 733-35 (explaining 
why health information technologies have yet to achieve such disruption). 
 128 For a description of the futuristic ambitions of personalized medicine and 
related trends, see Melanie Swan, Health 2050: The Realization of Personalized Medicine 
through Crowdsourcing, the Quantified Self, and the Participatory Biocitizen, 2 J. 
PERSONALIZED MED. 93 (2012). 
 129 The “quantified self” movement, founded by two Wired magazine editors, seeks 
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“lifelogging” phenomenon,130 and the rising era of “big data.”131 These 
trends converge in mobile health. Mobile apps that allow consumers 
to collect more granular health data about themselves, and in more 
frequent intervals, might lead to better-tailored diagnoses and 
treatments. This data collection effort is made possible through 
wearable sensors, ingestible diagnostic devices,132 and advances in 
bioinformatics that inspired, in part, the “quantified self” and 
“lifelogging” phenomena. And the “big data” era promises to use 
advances in large-scale data crunching to engage this flood of data in 
more and more surprising ways.133 A byproduct of these phenomena is 
the “deskilling” of medicine  demystifying medical practice that for 
decades has been based on idiosyncratic professional judgments and 
intuitions rather than hard data and evidence-based medicine.134 To 
 
to use various technologies, including biometric sensors and wearable devices, to 
collect data about ourselves and our health. It is also known as “self tracking,” “body 
hacking,” and by other labels. For popular descriptions, see Kashmir Hill, Adventures 
in Self-Surveillance, a.k.a. The Quantified Self, a.k.a. Extreme Naval-Gazing, FORBES 
(Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/04/07/adventures-in-
self-surveillance-aka-the-quantified-self-aka-extreme-navel-gazing/; The Quantified 
Self: Counting Every Moment, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/21548493.  
 130 “Lifelogging,” closely related to the “quantified self” movement, is the practice 
of using computing technologies to comprehensively archive one’s existence, 
including but not necessarily involving one’s health. See Anita L. Allen, Dredging Up 
the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 48-49 (2008). 
 131 “Big data” refers collectively to the practice of collecting, analyzing, and using 
large quantities of information. See Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The 
Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 MD. L. REV. 682, 683 n.1 (2013). For a 
dystopian, fictional glimpse of what our quantified futures might look like, see GARY 
SHTEYNGART, SUPER SAD TRUE LOVE STORY (2010). 
 132 For example, several companies are developing “smart pill” technology, which 
allows patients to digest pills that transmit diagnostic data wirelessly, outside the 
body. In 2012, the FDA cleared for marketing an “ingestible event marker” by Proteus 
Biomedical, Inc., which can help track whether patients are adhering to their 
medication regimen. See Letter from Jonette Foy, Deputy Director for Science and 
Regulatory Policy, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, to Jafar Shenasa, Senior 
Manager, Proteus Biomedical, Inc. (July 20, 2012), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
cdrh_docs/pdf11/K113070.pdf. In 2013, the FDA proposed relaxing market clearance 
requirements for ingestible monitoring devices. See Medical Devices; General Hospital 
and Personal Use Monitoring Devices; Classification of the Ingestible Event Marker, 
78 Fed. Reg. 28,733 (May 16, 2013) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 880.6305) (classifying 
such devices as Class II and categorizing them as “ingestible event markers”). 
 133 See generally Pasquale, supra note 131 (arguing for a “grand bargain” between 
providers, administrative agencies, and patients to allow full access to data while 
attempting to protect personal information). 
 134 For a short discussion of the pros and cons, see Stefan Timmermans & Aaron 
Mauck, The Promises and Pitfalls of Evidence-Based Medicine, 24 HEALTH AFF. 18, 20-21 
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advocates, mobile health provides a logical, efficient vehicle for 
achieving these ideals.135 
Still, other innovations have fallen short of similar promises, such as 
the consumer-driven health care movement,136 and (so far) the 
electronic medical record, as embodied in the well-documented 
failures of Google Health, and before it, Healtheon.137 But some 
substrata of mobile health technologies, like telemedicine, have 
already made care more accessible in rural and other underserved 
areas.138 And given the trajectory of mobile phone users and health 




Improving health care quality, lowering costs, and increasing access 
has long been the Holy Trinity of health care  a triad that has eluded 
U.S. policymakers for decades.139 It would be extraordinary if 
smartphones and tablet computers could accomplish what federal and 
state policymakers have not. Is mobile health too good to be true? As 
desperate as the U.S. health care system is for genuine transformation, 
 
(2005). 
 135 See, e.g., ERIC TOPOL, THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF MEDICINE: HOW THE DIGITAL 
REVOLUTION WILL CREATE BETTER HEALTH CARE (2012) (discussing how the digital 
revolution will improve health care). 
 136 For a devastating critique of consumer-driven health insurance, see TIMOTHY 
STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT 
(2007). 
 137 See Terry, supra note 28, at 724-25. For the story of Healtheon, the precursor to 
ventures like Google Health, see MICHAEL LEWIS, THE NEW NEW THING: A SILICON 
VALLEY STORY (1999). 
 138 See FCC, CHAIRMAN GENACHOWSKI, supra note 117, at 2 (announcing the FCC 
Rural Health Care Pilot). For an excellent treatment of the legal and policy issues 
surrounding telemedicine, see Thomas R. McLean, The Offshoring of American 
Medicine: Scope, Economic Issues and Legal Liabilities, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 205 
(2005); see also Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Teleradiology: A Case Study 
of the Economic and Legal Considerations in International Trade in Telemedicine, 25 
HEALTH AFF. 1378, 1379-81 (2006). 
 139 See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, The Elusive Ideal of Market Competition in United States’ 
Health Care, in HEALTH CARE AND EU LAW 359 (J.W. van de Gronden et al. eds., 2011) 
(arguing that the implementation of market-based techniques in the United States 
have failed to lower cost, increase quality, or increase access); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, 
Why Can’t We Do What They Do? National Health Reform Abroad, 32 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 433 (2004) [hereinafter Why Can’t We Do What They Do?] (citing U.S. political 
institutions, U.S. social culture, the political power of providers, and the strength of 
path dependency as forces preventing healthcare reform). 
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many hope that mobile technologies can be the panacea.140 We cling to 
the notion that we can innovate our way to a better health care system, 
even though decades of innovation have not produced better 
outcomes or more efficiency relative to our peer countries.141 There are 
valid reasons for excitement. But there are equally valid reasons for 
healthy skepticism. The last quarter-century demonstrates that 
medical software quickly evolves to become more ubiquitous and 
more critical to patient safety. Given the wide range of outcomes here 
 including the possibility of core transformations to health care 
delivery, consumption, and financing  how are policymakers 
responding? 
III. THE GOVERNMENT’S POSTURE 
The revolutionary potential of mobile health has not gone 
unnoticed. Mobile health is on the radars of Congress and over half a 
dozen federal agencies, including the FDA, FCC, and FTC. In Part III, 
I demonstrate that contrary to prevailing sentiment, Congress and 
federal regulators are facilitating rather than stifling mobile health 
technologies. I argue that this posture is admirable, so long as it does 
not preclude meaningful oversight. 
A. The Food and Drug Administration 
The FDA has clear jurisdiction to regulate most of the mobile health 
technologies described above, though it is unclear how prepared the 
agency is. To understand the FDA’s approach to mobile health, and 
why mobile health will test the agency, one must first understand FDA 
jurisdiction. 
The FDA has always been burdened by its steadily expanding 
dominion. Every year, more companies introduce more products that 
fit within the FDA’s jurisdiction under the federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act.142 The Act grants the FDA jurisdiction over medical 
“devices,” which it defines very broadly as any product intended to 
 
 140 See Terry, supra note 28, at 723-24. 
 141 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An 
Essay on Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537, 547-48 (2006); Jost, 
Why Can’t We Do What They Do?, supra note 139, at 436. 
 142 See David C. Vladeck, The FDA and Deference Lost: A Self-Inflicted Wound or the 
Product of a Wounded Agency? A Response to Professor O’Reilly, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 
983, 998-99 (2008). See generally Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 
75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (2012)) 
(giving the FDA the authority to oversee the safety of food, drugs, and cosmetics). 
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diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease, or any product 
intended to affect the structure or function of the body (and that is not 
a drug).143 As Part I demonstrates, many mobile health technologies 
intend to perform one or more of these functions. 
“Intended use” is a key element in defining “devices,” and thus in 
defining the outer bounds of FDA jurisdiction. The agency, by 
regulation, has defined “intended use” as the objective intent of how 
those responsible for marketing the product intend it to be used.144 
The agency can determine objective intent by looking at the product 
itself, at the manufacturer’s claims about it, and at other oral and 
written statements by those marketing it.145 Moreover, the FDA can 
consider the “circumstances surrounding distribution of the article,” 
including widespread consumer use.146 Again, the typology of mobile 
health technologies in Part I demonstrates that the FDA has clear 
jurisdiction over most of these products. 
Thus, FDA jurisdiction depends in large part on a product’s 
intended functionality. As a result, FDA-regulated devices range from 
toothbrushes and Band-Aids to pacemakers and MRI machines.147 
Because devices are so numerous and varied, Congress and the FDA 
have prioritized which devices deserve more regulatory attention 
based on the risks they present. A mobile application thus might 
qualify as a Class I device (low risk), a Class II device (moderate risk), 
or a Class III device (high risk).148 The higher the classification, the 
more scrutiny the device receives. For example, to get to the market, 
 
 143 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012) (defining “device” as “an instrument, apparatus, 
implement, machine, contrivance . . . or other similar or related article, including any 
component, part, or accessory, which is . . . intended for use in the diagnosis of 
disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of 
disease, in man or other animals, or . . . intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body of man or other animals, and which does not achieve its primary 
intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or other 
animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of 
its primary intended purposes”). The FDA considers device accessories to be finished 
devices themselves. See 21 C.F.R. § 820.3(l) (2013). 
 144 See 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (2013).  
 145 See id. 
 146 Id. Note, however, that FDA officials testified to Congress that the agency will not 
use actual use to determine “intended use.” See Letter from Michele Mital, Acting Associate 
Commissioner for Legislation, to Hon. Tim Murphy, Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of 
Representatives 2 (Mar. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Mital Letter], available at http:// 
www.genomicslawreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/HousemHealthLetter.pdf.  
 147 See Pollard & Branham, supra note 45, at *3. 
 148 See 21 U.S.C. § 360(c) (2012).  
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Class III devices generally must undergo premarket approval by the 
FDA,149 which typically requires clinical trials. In contrast, Class II 
devices must provide relatively cursory premarket notification, known 
as a 510(k) notice,150 which the FDA generally accepts. Finally, most 
of the lowest-risk Class I devices typically require no premarket 
notification at all.151 Thus, the FDA will impose very different 
gatekeeping requirements on mobile health products depending on 
the risks each one poses. 
The problem with device software in general, and mobile health 
apps in particular, is that they evolve quickly and frequently. FDA 
device classifications are not nearly as fluid as software products, 
particularly this latest generation of software apps. Like many new 
technologies, medical apps can complicate existing regulatory 
frameworks.152 
The FDA addressed these ambiguities in July 2011, when it 
published a Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical Applications, 
announcing a 90-day public comment period.153 The Draft Guidance 
followed months of speculation about how the FDA might confront 
medical apps. Indeed, days before the FDA published it, an industry 
coalition proposed its own competing framework.154 And, months 
earlier, the FDA issued a joint statement with the FCC explaining that 
the agencies wanted to facilitate wireless medical technologies.155 
The FDA finalized the guidance just two years later, in September 
2013156 (a quick turnaround by FDA standards, but an eternity by 
Silicon Valley standards). The guidance enunciates a tentative 
approach to medical apps, including the types of apps that it might 
 
 149 See 21 C.F.R. pt. 814.1 (2013).  
 150 See 21 U.S.C. § 360(k); 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(2) (2013). 
 151 See 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1). 
 152 See generally Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing the FDA’s long struggle to regulate 
innovative medical software). 
 153 See Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff, supra 
note 24, at 43,689; FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 1.  
 154 For example, in December 2010, attorneys for the mHealth Regulatory 
Coalition, an industry group, published a white paper on FDA’s potential approach to 
mobile medical apps. See Bradley Merrill Thompson et al., A Call for Clarity: Open 
Questions on the Scope of FDA Regulation of mHealth, MHEALTH REGULATORY COALITION, 
at i (Dec. 22, 2010), http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/ 
12/mrcwhitefinal122210.pdf.  
 155 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. & FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, JOINT STATEMENT ON 
WIRELESS MED. DEVICES 1 (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter FDA & FCC JOINT STATEMENT], 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-300200A1.pdf.  
 156 See FDA FINAL GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 1. 
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regulate, the types of apps that it might not, what rules might apply to 
regulated apps, and areas of lingering uncertainty that would benefit 
from further public comment.157 For example, who among the 
constellation of smartphone manufacturers, wireless providers, app 
store portals, and app developers may have to answer to the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration? The guidance reassures these industries 
that the FDA generally will withhold exercising jurisdiction over all 
but the last group (app developers), thus absolving the Apples, 
Googles, and Samsungs of the world that manufacture smartphones, 
tablets, and the platforms on which they operate.158 Instead, the FDA 
will train its eyes on those who create, design, label, or initiate 
specifications for a mobile medical app.159 
Second, the FDA’s guidance tries to delineate the types of apps that 
it will and will not regulate. In fairness to the FDA, this is not at all 
easy. As noted above, the statutory definition of “device” is a 
functional one,160 and depends on whether the manufacturer intends 
certain specified functionality.161 The FDA’s guidance clarifies that the 
agency will assert jurisdiction over “mobile medical apps,” which it 
defines as those apps that are intended to diagnose, cure, mitigate, 
treat, or prevent diseases or other conditions, or affect the structure or 
any function of the body.162 Again, many apps clearly qualify. Many 
clearly do not. And many are entirely unclear. 
The FDA’s guidance does an admirable job trying to translate the 
technical definition of “device” and explain the opaque intended use 
doctrine.163 But the app industry understandably remains confused, 
calling for more clarity.164 To that end, the FDA introduced a pyramid 
of jurisdiction.165 The pyramid itself represents the entire universe of 
 
 157 See id. at 4. 
 158 See id. at 9-10. 
 159 See id. at 9. 
 160 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act lists the things that can be “devices,” 
including “an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in 
vitro reagent,” or similar such objects that perform one of the listed functions. See 21 
U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012). This includes components, parts, or accessories. Id. 
 161 See 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (2013).  
 162 See FDA FINAL GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 7-8. 
 163 See id. at 7-8. Several commenters at the Public Workshop noted that the Draft 
Guidance is clearly aimed at smaller companies inexperienced with FDA regulations. 
See, e.g., FDA Public Workshop, supra note 85 (presenting statements of Bernie 
Liebler, AdvaMed, and Scott Thiel, who noted that this was the first FDA guidance 
document that he could remember that listed specific regulations in the C.F.R. that 
companies should recognize). 
 164 See FDA Public Workshop, supra note 85. 
 165 See BAKUL PATEL, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PUBLIC WORKSHOP — MOBILE 
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health-related apps.166 It then divides into three tiers: (i) the top tier 
representing “mobile medical apps” that meet the definition of 
“device” and are either accessories to separate FDA-regulated devices 
(such as a blood glucose monitor that plugs into an iPhone) or turn 
the smartphone or tablet itself into a regulated device; (ii) the middle 
tier representing apps that meet the technical definition of “device,” 
but not the FDA’s narrower conception of “mobile medical apps,” over 
which the FDA will exercise enforcement discretion; and (iii) a 
bottom tier of health apps that do not meet the definition of “device” 
and are thus beyond FDA jurisdiction.167 
The middle and bottom tiers are worth understanding. At the 
bottom, the Draft Guidance identifies a few species of non-regulated 
apps. For example, the FDA is not concerned with apps that replicate 
medical textbooks, reference materials, or teaching aids.168 The FDA is 
also not concerned with apps that allow users to log and track their 
general health or well-being, even if the app also suggests a course of 
action.169 The classic examples (inasmuch as apps can be “classics” 
already) are calorie trackers, appointment reminders, and exercise 
regimens.170 Finally, the FDA says it is not concerned with apps that 
replicate or automate office functions, like billing, reimbursement, and 
the like.171 The one proviso, however, is that if any of these apps use 
patient-specific data to generate customized diagnoses or treatment 
recommendations, FDA jurisdiction would apply.172 
But therein lies the gray area. Many medical apps apply a vast body 
of accumulated medical knowledge to patient-specific inputs, 
generating more granular diagnoses and treatments. All-in-one 
diagnostic apps like Pocket Doctor and WebMD’s Symptom Checker 
are the Precambrian ancestors of Tricorder-like devices. But the FDA 
punts these for later guidance.173 The Draft Guidance, for example, 
says that the FDA would continue to monitor apps that either 
 
MEDICAL APPS DRAFT GUIDANCE 8 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM271893.pdf.  
 166 See id.  
 167 See id. at 8; FDA FINAL GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 12, 
20-25. 
 168 See FDA FINAL GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 18, 20. 
 169 See id. at 16. 
 170 See id. at 25. 
 171 See id. at 16. 
 172 See id. at 15. 
 173 The guidance also emphasizes that it does not address safety concerns with 
wireless devices, and that it will issue separate guidances on related topics, including 
apps that analyze data from multiple medical devices. See id. at 12, 16-18. 
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“automate common medical knowledge available in the medical 
literature,” “allow individuals to self-manage their disease or 
condition,” or “automate common clinician’s diagnostic and treatment 
tasks.”174 Thus, the FDA’s guidance does not even confront some of 
the most provocative products. 
At the same time, the FDA’s guidance states that it will regulate apps 
that combine algorithms or formulae with patient information to 
generate a patient-specific diagnosis or treatment recommendation to 
be used in clinical practice.175 The line between this category and the 
previous one is not very clear, and promises to blur even further as 
developers envision new products with new functionalities. For 
example, will the FDA regulate all-in-one diagnostic apps intended for 
patient use? These apps might tell a parent whether to take a child to 
the emergency room or not, or recommend other important actions 
(or inaction), as the Scanadu example demonstrates.176 Part IV, below, 
emphasizes the dangers of relying blindly on medical software. 
Thus, the FDA says that it will regulate apps that obviously are 
medical devices; that it will not regulate apps that obviously are not; 
and that it will defer on the provocative middle tier of apps, over 
which the agency will exercise enforcement discretion.177 Yet, at the 
same time, the FDA “strongly recommends” that app manufacturers in 
this gray area follow the FDA’s extensive Quality Systems 
regulations,178 which require manufacturers to design and manufacture 
their products in accordance with certain standards.179 Thus, in the 
same breath, the FDA is telling certain mobile health products that 
they may not fall within FDA jurisdiction, but that they should follow 
FDA rules anyway. 
This language pushes the FDA’s guidance well beyond its 
disclaimers. The FDA makes clear that the guidance is a nonbinding 
draft, intended only to solicit public comments.180 This caution is by 
 
 174 FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 12 n.13. 
 175 See id. at 14 (“[E]xamples include mobile apps that provide a questionnaire for 
collecting patient-specific lab results and compute the prognosis of a particular 
condition or disease, perform calculations that result in an index or score, calculate 
dosage for a specific medication or radiation treatment, or provide recommendations 
that aid a clinician in making a diagnosis or selecting a specific treatment for a 
patient.”). 
 176 For a video vividly demonstrating the possibilities, and the certainty with which 
apps promise to provide actionable advice, see SCANADU, supra note 1.  
 177 See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 12. 
 178 See 21 C.F.R. pt. 820.5 (2013). 
 179 See FDA FINAL GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 13. 
 180 See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 4. 
  
1206 University of California, Davis [Vol. 47:1173 
design. More than other agencies, the FDA must be explicit that its 
guidance documents are not legally binding.181 Thus, as with most 
FDA guidances, it features a sort of black box warning emphasizing 
that the guidance, when finalized, will represent the FDA’s current 
thinking on the topic and nothing more.182 Regulated firms are free to 
take alternative approaches, as long as they comply with the 
underlying statute and regulations.183 Of course, notwithstanding this 
boilerplate, few people understand FDA guidance documents as being 
so impotent.184 
Shortly after it published the Draft Guidance, the FDA held a two-
day public workshop to ventilate this framework.185 Some clear themes 
emerged. 
First, the FDA is well aware that it lacks technical expertise on 
mobile technologies. Agency staff made several overtures expressing 
technical deference to the app industry.186 In fact, anyone concerned 
with the FDA’s tentative approach towards device software over the 
last twenty-five years would view the agency’s comments as being 
over-solicitous of those it is supposed to regulate. 
Second, the app industry is relatively naïve to any kind of 
regulation, not to mention the uniquely technical requirements 
imposed by the FDA.187 Several comments by industry representatives 
betrayed ignorance of even basic FDA rules, as well as profound 
confusion with more advanced concepts like intended use.188 
 
 181 See 21 U.S.C. § 371(h) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 3(iv) (2013). 
 182 See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 4. 
 183 See id. The entire blurb reads: 
This draft guidance when finalized will represent the Food and Drug 
Administration’s (FDA’s) current thinking on this topic. It does not create or 
confer any rights for or on any person and does not operate to bind FDA or 
the public. You can use an alternative approach if the approach satisfies the 
requirements of the applicable statutes and regulations. If you want to 
discuss an alternative approach, contact the FDA staff responsible for 
implementing this guidance. If you cannot identify the appropriate FDA 
staff, call the appropriate number listed on the title page of this guidance. 
Id. 
 184 See infra Part IV.B. 
 185 See FDA Public Workshop, supra note 85. FDA announced the public workshop 
in August. Mobile Medical Applications Draft Guidance; Public Workshop, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 50,231 (Aug. 12, 2011); see Mobile Medical Applications Draft Guidance; Public 
Workshop; Correction, 76 Fed. Reg. 55,068 (Sept. 6, 2011). 
 186 See FDA Public Workshop, supra note 85. 
 187 See id. 
 188 See, e.g., id. (pointing out that Kerry McDermott, the Senior Policy Director of 
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Third, the industry understandably wants the FDA to clarify which 
apps it will and will not regulate.189 There were several suggestions 
that the FDA should regulate apps based on the risks they present, 
rather than their intended uses.190 This recommendation confuses the 
first-order question of FDA jurisdiction with the second-order 
question of how the FDA will regulate devices that fall under its 
jurisdiction.191 
Finally, the workshop revealed a near-consensus that mobile health 
represents a genuine paradigm shift for our health care system. 
Commenters observed that the real benefits of medical apps might 
accrue to the next aging generation, not the current one.192 But this 
was viewed as a matter of when, not if. 
The comments also reflected a near-consensus that the FDA’s 
regulatory authority might not map very well onto this technology. 
For example, should the FDA require evidence that apps are safe and 
effective before they are cleared for marketing?193 Would the user 
reviews that typically appear at the point of sale (in app stores) be a 
good indicator of whether the app is safe and effective?194 Will low-
quality apps undermine the entire industry by eroding user 
confidence?195 Would alternatives like private certification standards 
be superior to centralized government oversight?196 Will consumers 
trust apps just because they are cleared by the FDA?197 Will one-size-
fits-all regulation work for such interactive, customized applications 
that are frequently updated?198 Is it feasible to regulate medical apps at 
all, given the sheer number of similar health applications already on 
the Internet (for example, one commenter noted that a Google search 
 
the West Wireless Health Institute, did not know what “intended use” was before the 
workshop). 
 189 See id. (statement of Dave Eichler). 
 190 See id. (statement of Grant Elliott).  
 191 The FDA classifies devices based on risk, which determines how each device 
may enter the market and the requirements that apply once it does. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360c 2(c) (2012). 
 192 See FDA Public Workshop, supra note 85 (statement of Donna Tillman). 
 193 See id. (statement of John LaLonde). 
 194 See id. (providing the statement of Grant Elliott, which argues that users will 
gravitate to apps that work and delete from their phones ones that do not). 
 195 See id. 
 196 Since the 2011 FDA workshop, private certification has spawned. For example, 
Happtique offers perhaps the most well-known private sector certification program for 
mobile health apps. See App Certification, HAPPTIQUE, http://www.happtique.com/app-
certification/.  
 197 See FDA Public Workshop, supra note 85 (statement of Grant Elliott). 
 198 See id. (statement of Bernie Liebler). 
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for “BMI calculator” generated 9,000 hits).199 Does the FDA need to 
regulate at all if medical malpractice liability will encourage physicians 
not to misuse or over-rely on apps?200 
Of course, even the FDA’s relatively friendly Draft Guidance, which 
bends over backwards to accommodate the industry, is criticized by 
the industry for simultaneously being too burdensome and too vague. 
For example, an industry group called the mHealth Regulatory 
Commission submitted a 220-page comment to the FDA in response 
to the Draft Guidance, in which it urged the agency to promote 
innovation in the mobile health industry and reduce unnecessary 
regulation.201 
The FDA’s approach to mobile health also has been a frequent topic 
in Congress. In May 2012, Senators Michael Bennet (D-CO) and Orrin 
Hatch (R-UT) proposed an amendment to a pending FDA 
appropriations bill that would have prohibited the FDA from finalizing 
the Draft Guidance until September 2013,202 a proposal that some 
industry groups opposed as introducing even more regulatory 
uncertainty for the industry.203 Another proposed bill by 
Representative Mike Honda (D-CA) took a different tack, by 
recommending that the FDA create an entirely new center to facilitate 
mobile health technologies.204 One bill that did become law simply 
requires the FDA to coordinate with the FCC and the Office of the 
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology to 
recommend “an appropriate, risk-based regulatory framework 
 
 199 See id. (statement of Grant Elliott). 
 200 See id. (statement of Leslie Kelly Hall). 
 201 See Comments to FDA’s Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical Applications: Docket 
No. FDA-2011-D-0530, MHEALTH REGULATORY COMM’N 3-4 (Oct. 20, 2011), available at 
http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/MRC-Comments-
on-FDA-Draft-MMA-Guidance.pdf.  
 202 See Brian Dolan, How Congress Almost Delayed the FDA’s Mobile Medical App 
Guidance, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (July 5, 2012), http://mobihealthnews.com/17707/how-
congress-almost-delayed-the-fdas-mobile-medical-app-guidance/. 
 203 Letter from Bradley Merrill Thompson, mHealth Regulatory Coalition, to Senator 
Tom Harkin, Chairman, Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, and Senator 
Michael B. Enzi, Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions (May 17, 2012), available 
at http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/MRC-Letter-to-
Senate-HELP-Committee-on-Proposed-Moratorium-FINAL.pdf. Congress passed the bill 
without the amendment, instead requiring FDA to report on a risk-based approach 
within 18 months. See Food and Drug Admin. Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 
(FDASIA), Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 618(a), 126 Stat. 993, 1063. 
 204 The bill would have created an Office of Wireless Health at the FDA, among 
other things. See Health Care Innovation and Marketplace Techs. Act of 2012, H.R. 
6626, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012). The bill died in committee. 
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pertaining to health information technology, including mobile medical 
applications, that promotes innovation, protects patient safety, and 
avoids regulatory duplication.”205 
Then, in March 2013, the House Energy & Commerce Committee 
held an unusual three days of hearings on the regulation of mobile 
health technologies, which warned the FDA to provide regulatory 
clarity without overregulating the industry.206 Again, the hearings 
demonstrate the great faith policymakers have in mobile health and its 
capacity to solve our health care system’s most pressing problems. The 
message is clear  the FDA is not to stifle innovation in one of our 
economy’s only bright spots. 
In the meantime, the FDA continues to address mobile medical apps 
as they arise. As noted above, the FDA has cleared the Reka E100 app, 
which transmits data about cardiac events from an external event 
recorder.207 The FDA cleared the iBGStar Diabetes Manager app, which 
connects with a blood glucose meter.208 And it has cleared the Mobile 
MIM app, which displays medical images for physicians, radiologists, 
and technicians.209 Other companies are also seeking the FDA’s 
blessing.210 As of March 2013, FDA officials report that the agency has 
reviewed around 100 discrete medical apps,211 averaging roughly 110 
 
 205 FDASIA § 618(a). The FDASIA Working Group’s report is expected in 2013. 
 206 See Health Information Technologies: Harnessing Wireless Innovation: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Commc’s & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 
113th Cong. 2 (2013), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/health-
information-technologies-harnessing-wireless-innovation (statement of Robert Jarrin, 
Senior Director, Government Affairs, Qualcomm Inc.).  
 207 These are Class II medical devices per 21 C.F.R. § 870.2340 (2014). FDA 
approved the REKA E100 by Reka Ltd., in September 2011.  
 208 Sanofi-Aventis received FDA clearance for the iBGStar Diabetes Manager 
Application (510(k) k103544). The document suggests that this is a Class I device 
under 21 C.F.R. § 862.2100 (2014) (data processing module for clinical use).  
 209 These are Class II medical devices per 21 C.F.R. § 892.2050 (2014). The FDA 
cleared the ImageGrid Radiology Viewer app by Candelis, Inc. in October 2009, the 
Mobile MIM app by MIM Software, Inc. in February 2011, and the ASTRA by Candelis, 
Inc. in September 2011. See Astra, 510(k) Summary of Safety (FDA Form 510(k)) (May 
17, 2011), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf11/k111694.pdf; MIM Software 
Inc., 510(k) Summary of Safety and Effectiveness (FDA Form 510(k)) (Sept. 30, 2011), 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf11/k112930.pdf; REKA Pte. Ltd., supra 
note 59. 
 210 See Brian Dolan, Digital Health’s Busy Summer for FDA Clearances, 
MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Aug. 14, 2012), http://mobihealthnews.com/18216/digital-health-
busy-summer-for-fda-clearances/.  
 211 Health Information Technologies: Administration Perspectives on Innovation and 
Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. 
on Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Health Info. Admin. 
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days with each review.212 And the agency finalized its Draft Guidance 
in September 2013.213 
Similarly, the FDA is tracking adverse events related to medical 
apps, some of which portend future problems that might arise. For 
example, in 2011 the FDA received a report that a neurostimulator 
had malfunctioned because the patient had spent hours with an 
iPhone near the head while the phone was in GPS (global positioning 
system) mode.214 The neurostimulator thus turned off, but the patient 
suffered no injury.215 Also in 2011, Pfizer alerted physicians in a “Dear 
Doctor” letter that its popular Rheumatology Calculator app was 
computing incorrectly, recalling it from the market.216 And in 2012, 
Sanofi Aventis recalled a medical app for diabetics because the 
software “could miscalculate an insulin dose potentially resulting in 
dangerously low or high blood glucose levels in diabetic patients.”217 
Both recalls were voluntary. 
In May 2013, the FDA sent its first regulatory letter to a mobile 
health company.218 The letter was directed to Biosense, maker of the 
uCheck Urine analyzer app, used as an automated reader and 
urinalysis program for reagent strips marketed by Bayer and 
Siemens.219 The letter explained that the product qualifies as a medical 
device and must be precleared by the FDA.220 The agency’s letter was 
 
Perspectives Hearing], available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/health-
information-technologies-administration-perspectives-innovation-and-regulation 
(statement of Christy L. Foreman, Director, Office of Device Evaluation, FDA).  
 212 See Mital Letter, supra note 146, at 3. 
 213 See FDA FINAL GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24. 
 214 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MAUDE ADVERSE EVENT REPORT: MDT PUERTO 
RICO OPERATIONS CO., JUNCOSRESTORE ULTRASTIMULATOR, SPINAL-CORD, TOTALLY 
IMPLANTED FOR PAIN RELIEF (Aug. 23, 2011), available at http://www.accessdata. 
fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfmaude/TextSearch.cfm (document can be found by 
selecting the year 2011, and searching for the keywords “Juncosrestore” and 
“iPhone”).  
 215 See id. 
 216 See “Pfizer Rheumatology Calculator” iPhone/Android Application — Important 
Information, PFIZER 1 (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.pharma-mkting.com/images/Pfizer_ 
Rheum_BugLetter.pdf.  
 217 Mital Letter, supra note 146, at 3; see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLASS 2 
RECALL, SANOFI AVENTIS DIAMIGO IPHONE APP (Dec. 22, 2012), available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfRES/res.cfm?id=114792.  
 218 See generally Letter from James L. Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient Safety & Prod. 
Quality, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Myshkin Ingawale, Biosense Techs. Private Ltd. 
(May 21, 2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/ 
Industry/ucm353513.htm (containing the full text of the letter).  
 219 See id.  
 220 See id. 
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titled, awkwardly, as an “It Has Come To Our Attention Letter,” which 
lacks the punch and publicity of the more traditional FDA Warning 
Letters.221 Apparently, these letters are intended for private 
consumption by well-meaning novices  although the Biosense letter 
was widely disseminated as the FDA’s first foray into medical app 
enforcement.222 
Thus, the FDA marches forward, but timidly. The agency faces 
distinct pressure from both Congress and the mobile health industry 
to facilitate rather than regulate these new products. Patient safety and 
consumer protection have not been the overriding concerns thus far. 
Certainly, the first generation of medical apps does not seem overly 
dangerous, particularly compared to the many drugs and devices 
under the FDA’s jurisdiction. But, as Part IV demonstrates below, the 
risks may be latent. 
B. Other Agencies 
As with many new technologies, multiple regulators have an interest 
in mobile health. These agencies too have adopted a posture of 
facilitating rather than regulating mobile health, with some 
exceptions. 
One exception is the Federal Trade Commission. Although the FTC 
primarily is concerned that medical apps will compromise privacy and 
data security,223 the agency also polices unsubstantiated product 
claims, a charge it shares with the FDA. In 2011, the FTC brought two 
maiden cases against medical apps that claimed to treat acne. The apps 
(Acne Pwner and Acne App) flashed alternating colored lights from a 
smartphone screen, which users were instructed to hold near their 
faces.224 The FTC charged both with making unsubstantiated 
 
 221 See id.; see also Alexander Gaffney, FDA Sends Unusual Letter to Maker of iPhone-
Based Testing Product, REGULATORY FOCUS (May 22, 2013), available at 
http://www.raps.org/focus-online/news/news-article-view/article/3497.aspx.  
 222 See Gaffney, supra note 221. 
 223 See generally Overview of Federal Role in Mobile Health, HEALTHIT.GOV, 
http://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchers-implementers/overview-federal-role-
mobile-health (last visited June 24, 2013) (explaining the role of the FCC in mobile 
health). Risks to patient privacy and data security are significant with mobile health 
applications, but I do not address them here. Even apps that track sensitive health 
information are not necessarily covered by federal privacy laws like HIPAA. Media 
stories observe quite astutely that cell phones are “increasingly becoming a portable 
medical record.” See Nancy Shute, Apps Can Help You Take a Pill, but Privacy’s a Big 
Question, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/12/ 
01/143005028/apps-can-help-you-take-a-pill-but-privacys-a-big-question.  
 224 See Ann Carrns, F.T.C.: No App to Cure Acne, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2011), 
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marketing claims, including one claim that a medical journal article 
supported the treatment, when it did not.225 Acne Pwner was 
downloaded 3,300 times for 99 cents each, and AcneApp was 
downloaded 11,600 times at $1.99 each.226 Although the FTC’s fines 
were modest (just $1,700 for Acne Pwner and $14,924 for 
AcneApp),227 they demonstrated that the FTC would scrutinize health 
claims made by apps.228 Still, it remains unclear how the FTC will 
police less objectionable claims, or those supported by more credible 
evidence. The FTC traditionally has been more lenient on therapeutic 
claims than the FDA.229 In the meantime, the FTC has created a 
Mobile Technology Unit to develop expertise on mobile apps and to 
coordinate the agency’s mobile enforcement efforts.230 
Outside the FDA and FTC, the third major agency that can claim 
jurisdiction over medical apps is the Federal Communications 
Commission, which regulates the radio frequencies used by mobile 
devices.231 As such, the FCC already shares jurisdiction over wireless 
medical devices like pacemakers.232 Perhaps for this reason, medical 
apps have been on the FCC’s radar longer than other agencies, despite 
the FCC’s relatively narrow charge here. 
 
http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/f-t-c-no-app-to-cure-acne/?_r=0; Camille 
Sweeney, Better Skin to the Touch?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2009/12/31/fashion/31Skinbox.html.  
 225 See Kobe Brown & Gregory W. Pearson, dba DERMAPPS, Analysis of Proposed 
Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,041 (Sept. 15, 2011), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/09/110915kobebrownfrn. 
pdf; Andrew N. Finkel, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 76 
Fed. Reg. 57,043 (Sep. 15, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/cases/2011/09/110915finkelanal.pdf.  
 226 See Carrns, supra note 224. 
 227 See id. 
 228 Note, however, that in 2012, an Administrative Law Judge for the FTC required 
a lesser than usual standard of scientific proof for POM Wonderful, which claimed 
that its products, derived from pomegranates, could address heart disease, prostate 
cancer, or erectile dysfunction. In re POM Wonderful LLC, No. 9344, 2012 WL 
2340406, at *1 (F.T.C. May 17, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/cases/2012/05/120521pomdecision.pdf (initial decision).  
 229 See PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 275-
76 (3d ed. 2007). 
 230 The Mobile Technology Unit, created by David Vladeck, resides in the Division 
of Financial Practices of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. See Bureau of 
Consumer Prot., Division of Financial Practices, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc. 
gov/bcp/bcpfp.shtm (last visited June 24, 2013).  
 231 See Pollard & Branham, supra note 45, at *6 (citing the Federal 
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2012)).  
 232 See Overview of Federal Role in Mobile Health, supra note 223.  
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In July 2010, the FCC and FDA jointly announced that they would 
simultaneously try to promote wireless medical devices and ensure 
that they are “safe, reliable and secure.”233 The agencies memorialized 
this announcement in a Memorandum of Understanding.234 They then 
hosted a public meeting, during which the FDA Commissioner and 
FCC Chairman shared remarks about the tremendous potential of 
wireless medical devices, followed by several industry panels.235 The 
tone of the meeting was aspirational, preliminary, and introductory  
the speakers addressed how wireless medical devices work and how 
they might be regulated.236 
Since then, the FCC has remained engaged in mobile health. In 
2012, the FCC announced that it would reserve additional spectrum 
space for wireless medical body area networks (“MBANs”), which 
devices and apps can use to constantly monitor patients.237 Indeed, the 
FCC chairman’s remarks read like an industry brochure, suggesting 
that wireless devices may save millions of lives and billions in health 
spending.238 The FCC followed this announcement by hosting an 
mHealth Summit, during which representatives from industry, 
academia, and government (including the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, the FDA, the HHS, the National Institutes of 
Health, and the Department of Veterans Affairs) discussed mobile 
health devices.239 The FCC Chairman reiterated that “mHealth” is a 
transformative, disruptive technology that may improve quality care, 
lower costs, and save lives.240 
 
 233 FDA & FCC JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 155; see also Press Release, FCC, FDA 
Take Steps to Promote Innovation and Investment in Wireless-Enabled Medical 
Devices (July 26, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DOC-300226A1.pdf.  
 234 See Memorandum of Understanding between the Fed. Commc’n Comm’n and 
the U.S. Food & Drug Admin. Ctr. for Devices and Radiological Health (2010), 
available at http:/hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-300200A2.pdf.  
 235 See FCC/FDA Joint Meeting on Life Saving Wireless Med. Tech. Day-1, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter FCC/FDA Joint Meeting], http://www.fcc.gov/ 
events/fccfda-joint-meeting-life-saving-wireless-medical-technology-day-1; Public Meeting: 
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ADMIN. (July 26–27, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/ 
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 236 See generally FCC/FDA Joint Meeting, supra note 235 (providing a transcript of 
Day 1 and Day 2 of the Joint Meeting). 
 237 See FCC, CHAIRMAN PROPOSAL, supra note 86, at 1. 
 238 See id. at 1-2. 
 239 See FCC, CHAIRMAN GENACHOWSKI, supra note 117, at 1. 
 240 See FCC CHAIRMAN JULIUS GENACHOWSKI, PREPARED REMARKS ON MED. BODY AREA 
NETWORKS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. HOSP. 1 (May 17, 2012), available at 
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In addition to the FDA, FTC, and FCC, several other agencies also 
have medical apps on their radars.241 For example, the Department of 
Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology has led 
discussions about privacy and data security standards for medical 
apps.242 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and its parent 
agency HHS have created several programs to encourage physicians, 
hospitals, and insurers to use health information technologies (known 
as “health IT” or just “HIT”) to deliver safer, higher quality, and more 
efficient care to patients.243 These programs encourage the industry to 
use electronic records, prescribe medicines, coordinate patient care, 
and measure quality outcomes electronically.244 
Many of these efforts are superintended by the Office of the National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology, situated within HHS 
by the 2008 stimulus bill, whose charge is to promote a national 
health IT infrastructure.245 In recent testimony, the National 
Coordinator told Congress that health information technologies will 
help transform “how care is paid for and delivered and how patients 
engage in their own health.”246 
Thus, contrary to regulatory alarmists who claim a federal assault on 
mobile health technologies,247 the federal government is actively 
promoting them, or at the very least is creating a very sympathetic 
regulatory environment. To wit, some federal agencies have entire 
programs dedicated to developing and promoting medical apps. The 
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 241 See Pollard & Branham, supra note 45, at *2. 
 242 See Overview of Federal Role in Mobile Health, supra note 223. 
 243 See Pollard & Branham, supra note 45, at *7-8 (surveying programs). 
 244 See id. (citing, among other programs, the Medicare Improvements for Patients 
and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-275, 122 Stat. 2494, and the American 
Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115). 
 245 See generally About ONC, OFF. OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. 
TECH., http://www.healthit.gov/newsroom/about-onc (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) 
(providing a diagram about the structure of the Office and its mission). The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, familiarly known as the “stimulus bill,” 
included the HITECH Act (the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act) at Title XIII, which created the Office of the National Coordinator 
within HHS. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
123 Stat. 115 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-11 (2012)). 
 246 Health Info. Admin. Perspectives Hearing, supra note 211, at *25 (statement of 
Farzad Mostashari). 
 247 See, e.g., Joel White, WHITE: FDA’s Assault on Mobile Technologies, WASH. TIMES 
(Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/7/fdas-assault-on-
mobile-technologies/ (mischaracterizing the FDA’s Draft Guidance as a “proposed 
regulation”). 
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most prominent is the U.S. Department of Defense, which created a 
National Center for Telehealth and Technology to evaluate mental 
health technologies for military personnel.248 The program features 
several apps, including: an app that helps physicians diagnose and 
treat traumatic brain injuries and mental disorders;249 an app that 
allows users to assess themselves for post-traumatic stress disorder 
(“PTSD”);250 an app that uses clinical guidelines to help providers treat 
mild traumatic brain injuries;251 and even an app that connects to EEG 
devices, EMG devices, ECG/EKG devices, respirators, and other 
biometric monitors.252 The U.S. Army runs a similar program, the 
Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center, which 
researches health informatics, mobile health, telemedicine, and 
computational biology, among other things.253 The Center proclaims 
that it is focused on “putting research findings into the hands of 
warfighters while looking toward wider civilian utility.”254 As in 
decades past, the U.S. military is at the forefront of medical 
advancement. 
Other federal agencies are also studying and promoting mobile 
health. The National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) and the National 
Science Foundation recently convened an mHealth Evidence 
Workshop to discuss how to gather scientific evidence to support 
mobile health technologies.255 This is part of a larger program at HHS 
 
 248 See About T2, NAT’L CTR. FOR TELEHEALTH & TECH., http://www.t2.health.mil/ 
about.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).  
 249 See Robyn Mincher, New Mobile App Helps Troops to Self-Manage Behavior, 
Stress, NAT’L CTR. FOR TELEHEALTH & TECH. (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.t2.health.mil/ 
news/new-mobile-app-helps-troops-self-manage-behavior-stress#.UsEpI7TWubF.  
 250 This app was developed by the Department of Defense’s National Center of 
Telehealth and Technology (T2) program, in collaboration with the Department of 
Veteran Affairs’ National Center for PTSD. Notably, the app’s website says that: “The 
assessment does not formally diagnose PTSD.” The app won the 2011 FCC 
Chairman’s Awards for Advancement in Accessibility. See PTSD Coach, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
TELEHEALTH & TECH., http://www.t2health.org/apps/ptsd-coach (last visited June 24, 
2013).  
 251 This app was developed by the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychologic 
Health and Traumatic Brain Injury. See mTBI Pocket Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR TELEHEALTH 
& TECH., http://www.t2health.org/apps/mtbi (last visited June 24, 2013). 
 252 See BioZen, supra note 64 (disclaiming that “[t]hese devices and BioZen are not 
designed or intended for psychological therapy or medical treatments”).  
 253 See Homepage, TELEMEDICINE & ADVANCED TECH. RES. CTR., http://www.tatrc.org/ 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2014).  
 254 Id.  
 255 See mHealth — Workshop on “mHealth Evidence,” OFF. OF BEHAVIORAL & SOC. 
SCI. RES., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Aug. 16, 2011), 
available at http://obssr.od.nih.gov/scientific_areas/methodology/mhealth/mhealth-
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and the NIH to subsidize research on mobile health applications.256 In 
fact, the NIH itself offers several health-related apps.257 
In short, federal agencies are assisting rather than assaulting mobile 
health technologies. Even international bodies like the World Health 
Organization (“WHO”) are examining the vast potential of mobile 
health.258 
Congress usually is the last to respond, and is so here. Although a 
few congressional committees have considered medical apps, they 
usually do so in passing.259 Only one statute has addressed them 
directly,260 and that was to preserve the FDA’s Draft Guidance from 
being frozen in carbonite by congressmen concerned with premature 
regulation.261 Indeed, would-be regulators like the FDA and FCC have 
 
workshop.aspx.  
 256 See mHealth — Mobile Health Technologies, OFF. OF BEHAVIORAL & SOC. SCI. RES., 
NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., available at 
http://obssr.od.nih.gov/scientific_areas/methodology/mhealth/index.aspx (last visited 
June 24, 2013).  
 257 See Gallery of Mobile Apps and Sites, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT’L INST. 
HEALTH, available at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/mobile/ (last visited June 24, 2013).  
 258 See Global Observatory for eHealth, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/ 
goe/en/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). Note that like the FTC, the WHO’s regulatory 
concerns focus on privacy and data security, rather than whether medical apps 
actually work and do what they claim to do. See generally, Legal Frameworks for 
eHealth: Global Observatory for eHealth Series — Vol. 5, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2012) 
(focusing largely on privacy concerns, and questions regarding the extent of privacy 
expected), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2012/9789241503143_ 
eng.pdf.  
 259 See The Impact of Medical Device and Drug Regulation on Innovation, Jobs, and 
Patients: A Local Perspective: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 110-113 (2011) (statement of Rep. Brian P. Bilbray 
comparing FDA regulation to a “red tide” that kills a health environment for 
innovation); Overcoming Rural Health Care Barriers: Use of Innovative Wireless Health 
Technology Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on 
Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. 20-22, 29, 56-57, 72-75, 85 (2010); Aging in Place: The 
National Broadband Plan and Bringing Healthcare Technology Home: Hearing Before the 
S. Special Comm. on Aging, 111th Cong. 9, 37-38, 77 (2010). The one major exception 
was the three-day hearing hosted by the House Energy & Commerce Committee in 
March 2013. See supra note 206. 
 260 See Food and Drug Admin. Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
144, § 618(a), 126 Stat. 993, 1063. 
 261 In The Empire Strikes Back, Han Solo is frozen in carbonite, until he was 
rescued in Return of the Jedi. STAR WARS EPISODE V: THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (20th 
Century Fox 1980); STAR WARS EPISODE VI: RETURN OF THE JEDI (20th Century Fox 
1983). The FDA’s Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical Apps faced a similar fate. As 
Congress considered the 2012 FDA user fee bill, Senators Michael Bennett (D-CO) 
and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) proposed an amendment that would have prohibited the 
FDA from finalizing its Draft Guidance until September 30, 2013. See Bennett-Hatch 
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been upbraided by skeptical members of Congress for daring to 
regulate some of these products.262 
Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, federal regulators are 
sympathetic, not hostile, to mobile health. Again, this in itself is not 
problematic, so long as this sympathetic posture does not sacrifice 
meaningful oversight. Mobile health will only fulfill its immense 
promise if federal regulators help ensure that the technologies are safe 
and effective, and function as they claim. 
IV. ENTERING THE REGULATORY FEEDBACK LOOP 
The FDA’s response to mobile health is the continuation of a longer 
narrative. The FDA, our country’s oldest consumer protection agency, 
has long been oriented towards traditional food, drug, and device 
products.263 But over the last twenty-five years, the FDA has had to 
confront “laser age” products like computer software.264 Part IV, then, 
tells the broader story of the FDA’s experience regulating computer 
hardware and software over the last quarter-century, dating back to 
the mid-1980s. I argue that the FDA risks repeating the same mistakes 
it made when first addressing device software twenty-five years ago. 
Mobile health, after all, simply represents the latest incarnation of 
device software. 
I argue that for the FDA to provide meaningful oversight of mobile 
health, it must confront its longstanding posture towards medical 
device software more generally, which has relied on nonbinding 
guidance documents and spotty case-by-case enforcement. 
Confronting past regulatory failures will push the FDA into a 
regulatory “feedback loop,” in which the agency can identify past 
shortcomings and initiate corrective and preventive actions in 
response.265 History need not be doomed to repeat itself. 
 
Amendment, 112th Cong., (2d Sess. 2012) (on file with author).  
 262 See, e.g., Letter from Marsha Blackburn et al. to Margaret Hamburg and Julius 
Genachowski, supra note 125 (expressing concerns about the regulation process). 
 263 For a nice retrospective of the agency at its centennial, see FDA: A CENTURY OF 
CONSUMER PROTECTION (Wayne L. Pines ed., 1st ed. 2006). 
 264 I used the rather dated phrase “laser age” as a nod to President Gerald Ford, 
who used the phrase when he signed the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. 
L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539, which ushered in the modern regulatory framework for 
FDA oversight of devices: “The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 eliminate the 
deficiencies that accorded FDA ‘horse and buggy’ authority to deal with ‘laser age’ 
problems.” Gerald R. Ford, U.S. President, Statement on Signing the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976 (May 28, 1976), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
ws/?pid=6069.  
 265 For another example of how the spigot of information can be adjusted to affect 
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A. A Quarter-Century of Computerized Medicine 
As with many regulatory interventions, the FDA’s foray into 
software was prompted by tragedy.266 Between 1985 and 1987, a 
radiation machine called the Therac-25 massively overradiated 
patients in the United States and Canada, administering up to 100 
times the prescribed dose, sometimes burning literal holes in patients’ 
bodies.267 The Therac-25 (an abbreviation for therapeutic radiation 
computer) was notable for being the first radiation machine controlled 
primarily by software.268 The manufacturer, Atomic Energy of Canada 
Limited, designed the Therac-25 to rely on software, and thus chose to 
remove the hardware failsafes from previous versions.269 
The result was a cascade of errors. For example, the Therac-25’s 
user interface displayed cryptic error alerts like “MALFUNCTION 54,” 
which user manuals neglected to interpret.270 Persistent, daily 
malfunctions eventually numbed users, making them impervious to 
error alerts.271 In one episode, a patient died from a substantial 
radiation overdose five months after the operator ignored repeated 
error messages, some of which incorrectly warned of a substantial 
 
FDA regulation of medical devices, see Lawrence O. Gostin, The Deregulatory Effects of 
Preempting Tort Litigation, 299 JAMA 2313, 2313-15 (2008), which addresses how the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., holding that the FDCA’s scheme 
for regulating devices preempts conflicting or additional state law tort claims, removes 
civil discovery as a way to uncover unsafe or ineffective devices. Ironically, the very 
idea of using a feedback loop to reorient the FDA’s strategy towards mobile health 
derives in part from some of the same underlying thinking that now animates mobile 
health. See, e.g., Thomas Goetz, Harnessing the Power of Feedback Loops, WIRED (June 
19, 2011), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/06/ff_feedbackloop/5/ (discussing 
how advances in sensory technology enables some of the mobile health monitoring 
technologies discussed in Part I). I also owe this idea, in part, to the FDA’s own 
“corrective and preventive action” (CAPA) system, which requires device 
manufacturers to investigate manufacturing problems, correct them, and take action 
to prevent their root causes. See Corrective and Preventative Action, 21 C.F.R. 
§ 820.100 (2013).  
 266 The tragedy over thalidomide helped prompt the 1962 Drug Amendments. J. 
Richard Crout, William W. Vodra & Cole P. Werble, FDA’s Role in the Pathway to Safe 
and Effective Drugs, in FDA: A CENTURY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 263, 
at159, 168-69; see DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE 
AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 256-60 (2010). 
 267 For a comprehensive story of the Therac-25 saga, see NANCY G. LEVESON, 
Medical Devices: The Therac-25, in NANCY G. LEVESON, SAFEWARE: SYSTEM SAFETY AND 
COMPUTERS App. A (1995).  
 268 See id. at 3. 
 269 See id. 
 270 See id. at 17. 
 271 See id. at 7. 
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underdose.272 The manufacturer was overconfident in patching 
software errors, even though it could not identify their root causes 
when pressed to do so.273 Users developed a false sense of security that 
the Therac-25’s software would make it “virtually impossible to 
overdose a patient.”274 Indeed, the complacency was so entrenched 
that the initial reaction by radiation technicians, hospital physicists, 
and the manufacturer to patient complaints (“You burned me!”) was 
widespread disbelief (“That’s impossible.”).275 The manufacturer’s first 
safety review of the Therac-25 did not even cover its software.276 
Subsequent investigations and lawsuits revealed all types of bugs  
including, astoundingly, typing too fast, and moving the cursor up, 
both of which caused crashes and errors  as well as fundamental 
software design flaws.277 
When the FDA investigated these incidents, it required Atomic 
Energy to make several corrections, which were not fully implemented 
until after a recall two years later.278 The Therac-25 had entered the 
U.S. market via a 510(k) notification, by which the FDA cleared the 
device as being “substantially equivalent” to a predicate already on the 
market, despite its unprecedented reliance on software.279 The Therac-
25, like many software-driven devices today, was not subject to 
meaningful premarket review. 
The Therac-25 episode has since become a standard university case 
study in software failure.280 The authoritative report on it concluded 
that “[t]here seems to be a feeling among nonsoftware professionals 
that software will not or cannot fail, which leads to complacency and 
overreliance on computer functions.”281 At the time, the FDA’s 
response was considered “impressive,” given that it had no policy for 
medical software.282 
That began to change as a direct result of the Therac-25. In 1986, 
the FDA Commissioner Frank Young first announced in a speech that 
 
 272 See id. at 17-18. 
 273 See id. at 13, 16, 19. 
 274 Id. at 8. 
 275 See id. at 9, 15, 18. 
 276 See id. at 8. 
 277 See id. at 20-28. 
 278 See id. at 29, 40. 
 279 Id. at 29. 
 280 See Simson Garfinkel, History’s Worst Software Bugs, WIRED (Nov. 8, 2005), 
http://www.wired.com/software/coolapps/news/2005/11/69355. 
 281 LEVESON, supra note 267, at 44. 
 282 Id. at 48. 
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the agency would approach software with the “least regulation 
consistent with the requirements of public health and safety.”283 
Shortly thereafter, in 1987, the FDA published its first draft policy on 
software.284 In 1989, the FDA updated the document, which became 
known as the “Draft Software Policy.”285 The policy confirmed that the 
FDA’s “basic philosophy for computer products is to apply the least 
degree of regulatory control necessary to provide reasonable assurance 
of safety and effectiveness.”286 Since then, the FDA’s approach to 
computerized devices has been the archetype of regulatory 
minimalism. 
Like the 2011 Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical Applications, the 
1989 policy delineated which computer products the agency would 
and would not regulate.287 Both guidances tried to clarify how new 
technologies might fit into the statutory definition of “device,” written 
by Congress in 1976 when no one could have imagined today’s 
versions.288 
A key idea introduced in 1987 was that of “competent human 
intervention.”289 The FDA explained that it would exempt from 
regulation artificial intelligence and clinical decision support software 
as long as it allowed ample time for competent human intervention by 
the user.290 For example, the FDA would be more concerned with a 
computer program that alerted nurses to “Inject Dose Now!” than one 
recommending well ahead of time that nurses administer the dose at 
certain intervals, with opportunity for the nurse to consider those 
instructions. The distinction is whether “clinical judgment and 
experience can be used to check and interpret a system’s output” 
 
 283 Suzan Onel, Draft Revision of FDA’s Medical Device Software Policy Raises Warning 
Flags, MEDICAL DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUS. (Oct. 1, 1997), http://www.mddionline. 
com/article/draft-revision-fdas-medical-device-software-policy-raises-warning-flags. 
 284 See Draft Policy Guidance for Regulation of Computer Products; Availability, 52 
Fed. Reg. 36,104 (Sept. 25, 1987). The FDA began crafting the policy in 1985. See 
Medical Devices; Medical Software Devices; Notice of Public Workshop, 61 Fed. Reg. 
36,886 (July 15, 1996); Onel, supra note 283. 
 285 See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 5; FDA 
DRAFT SOFTWARE POLICY, supra note 22, at *1-3. 
 286 E. Stewart Crumpler & Harvey Rudolph, FDA Software Policy and Regulation of 
Medical Device Software, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 511, 513 (1997). 
 287 See FDA DRAFT SOFTWARE POLICY, supra note 22, at *2-3. 
 288 See Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act § 201(h), 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2012); Medical 
Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 513, 90 Stat. 539, 540-46; see also 
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 289 Draft Policy Guidance for Regulation of Computer Products, 52 Fed. Reg. 
36,104. 
 290 See FDA DRAFT SOFTWARE POLICY, supra note 22, at *2.  
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before “any impact on human health.”291 As discussed below, this 
distinction is neat but facile. 
The FDA never finalized the 1989 Draft Software Policy, and 
ultimately withdrew it in 2005.292 Nevertheless, during the past 
twenty-five years, lawyers have advised clients largely based on the 
1989 policy (even after being withdrawn), largely because this was the 
only concrete guidance available. Ironically, after the FDA withdrew 
the 1989 guidance, the agency explained that “it would be impractical 
to prepare an overarching software policy to address all of the issues 
related to the regulation of all medical devices containing software” 
because “the use of computer and software products as medical 
devices grew exponentially and the types of products diversified and 
grew more complex.”293 Thus, rather than providing more firm 
guidance as medical technology matured  during a profound 
computer revolution, no less  the FDA provided less. 
Although the FDA avoided announcing an overarching approach to 
software, it has exercised jurisdiction over various software devices on 
a case-by-case basis.294 For example, the FDA has created dozens of 
regulatory categories for devices that incorporate software, including 
medical calculators, cameras, lights, magnifiers, microscopes, 
monitors, recorders, reminders, scales, surgical tools, transmitters, and 
a host of data systems that store, display, and manipulate 
information.295 Many mobile applications will fall into one of these 
preexisting categories.296 But many will fit uneasily, or not at all. And 
in such cases, the FDA might have to create entirely new categories, 
 
 291 See id.  
 292 See Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and Drug 
Admin., 70 Fed. Reg. 824, 890 (Jan. 5, 2005). 
 293 FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 5 (referring to 
the 2005 withdrawal of the 1989 Draft Software Policy). 
 294 See id. 
 295 See id. app. B at 21-23 (listing 79 distinct device categories codified by the 
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 296 For example, the Draft Guidance identifies several existing categories that 
might fit many medical apps, including 21 C.F.R. §§ 880.6310 (devices that display, 
store, or transmit patient-specific medical device data in its original format), 
870.1875(b) (electronic stethoscope), 892.2050 (picture archiving and 
communications system), 862.1345 (glucose test system), 870.2300 (cardiac 
monitor), 870.1130 (electronic blood pressure monitor), 884.2740 (perinatal 
monitoring system), and 868.1890 (drug dose calculator), to name just those 
identified by the FDA in its Guidance. See id. at 14-15. 
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adding to the roughly 1,700 different device categories in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.297 
But by and large, the FDA has avoided proceeding by rule here. It 
has promulgated very few prospective regulations governing software, 
and what little it has done addresses relatively low-risk devices.298 For 
example, in 2011, the FDA finalized a regulation governing medical 
device data systems (“MDDS”),299 a narrow slice of products that 
simply transfer, store, display, or convert medical device data without 
doing much else, like analyzing the data or even charting it visually.300 
Indeed, to qualify as an MDDS, a product may not feature alarms or 
actively monitor patient data that a health care practitioner might use 
to make immediate treatment decisions.301 Undoubtedly, many mobile 
applications will qualify as MDDSs because they do nothing more than 
store, display, and transfer data. But these devices should not concern 
us much. 
Periodically, in the preambles to final rules, the FDA will 
acknowledge computer products. For example, when finalizing its 
Quality System regulation (“QSR”) for devices in 1996, the FDA 
observed that software design flaws and the failure to validate software 
after maintenance were the most common sources of software 
errors.302 The QSR, which establishes good manufacturing practices for 
devices,303 has been perhaps the one area in which the FDA has 
provided firm standards for device software. But the QSR is notable for 
giving manufacturers significant flexibility to design and manufacture 
devices according to customized specifications.304 This is both a 
 
 297 See 21 C.F.R. pts. 862-892 (2013). 
 298 For example, in 2011, the agency promulgated a rule classifying devices that 
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Medical Device Data Systems (“MDDS”). Medical Devices; Medical Device Data 
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(2013)). 
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 302 See Medical Devices, Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) Final Rule; 
Quality Systems Regulation, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,602 (Oct. 7, 1996). See U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., CURRENT GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
COMBINATION PRODUCTS 31-33 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
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design controls). 
 303 See 21 C.F.R. pt. 820 (2013). 
 304 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEDICAL DEVICES, QUALITY SYSTEM (QS) 
REGULATION/MEDICAL DEVICE GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICES (2011), available at 
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strength and a weakness  a strength in recognizing the diversity of 
medical devices and the implausibility of generating one-size-fits-all 
standards, but a weakness in decentralizing standards and delegating 
significant discretion to regulated firms. Of course, the FDA relies on 
guidance to explain how the QSR applies to software.305 
By and large, FDA oversight of software relies on guidance. Agency 
documents that summarize the FDA’s approach to software generally 
cite to the same cluster of five guidances.306 Following this tradition, 
the Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical Applications cites to the same 
five guidances, as well as four others discussing basic device 
regulations.307 The Draft Guidance also cites to over a dozen 
international standards published by groups like the International 
Electrotechnical Commission, the Institute for Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers, and the International Organization for 
Standardization.308 
Together, these documents form a cascade of quasi-regulation, 
recommendations, and “current thinking,” but few firm rules. 
Software does not stand on terra firma with the FDA. Looking back, 
the 1987 document was like a gateway drug that led to guidance after 
guidance for the next quarter-century. But the FDA’s response to 
software has not been commensurate with how ubiquitous and critical 




 305 See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SOFTWARE 
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VALIDATION, supra note 305; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FDA 
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B. “The Wonders and Brutality” of Innovation 
The Therac-25 saga not only prompted the FDA’s attention to 
software, but also presaged the next quarter-century of torrential 
innovation in computerized medicine. An agency long oriented 
towards more traditional products responded impressively in the 
absence of an overarching policy for software.309 
Yet, after twenty-five years with such a policy, history repeats itself. 
Between 2009 and 2011, the New York Times documented several 
hundred catastrophic injuries caused by software and user errors 
related to the newest generation of radiation machines.310 The 
incidents bear striking resemblance to the Therac-25 saga two decades 
earlier, demonstrating the “wonders and the brutality”311 of medical 
innovation. 
In one case, St. Vincent’s Hospital in Manhattan exposed a 41 year-
old tongue cancer patient to fatal doses of radiation for three 
consecutive days after the software repeatedly crashed.312 The medical 
physicist operating the machine had calibrated it to target cancerous 
tissue at the base of the patient’s tongue, without damaging 
surrounding healthy tissue  precisely the allure of new intensity 
modulated radiation therapy devices, which use complex software to 
beam radiation at cancerous tissue and little else.313 But after repeated 
error messages and software crashes, the machine erased the 
coordinates that would have shaped the beam; instead, it administered 
unmodulated radiation to his entire neck and the base of his skull, 
including the brain stem.314 The overdose “left him deaf, struggling to 
see, unable to swallow, burned, with his teeth falling out, with ulcers 
in his mouth and throat, nauseated, in severe pain and finally unable 
to breathe.”315 He died roughly two years after the mistake.316 
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Cures], http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/health/24radiation.html.  
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 314 See id. at 4. 
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In another case, a 32 year-old breast cancer patient at the State 
University of New York’s Downstate Medical Center in Brooklyn was 
administered three and a half times the prescribed dose of radiation 
each session for 27 days.317 She was the victim of “a baffling series of 
missteps,”318 again eerily reminiscent of the Therac-25. A radiation 
therapist had misprogrammed the device, which in turn omitted a 
metallic wedge that would have shaped the beam. Other therapists and 
staff then failed to catch the mistake, both when reviewing the 
patient’s treatment records, and more disturbingly, when an alert 
(“wedge OUT”) was displayed on the computer screen during her 
treatment.319 The N.Y. Department of Public Health observed, “[t]he 
fact that therapists failed to notice ‘wedge OUT’ on 27 occasions is 
disturbing.”320 The radiation seared a hole in her chest, which grew 
until her rib bones were openly visible. 
The Times reporters documented hundreds of similar mistakes: 90 
prostate cancer patients at a hospital in Philadelphia misdosed with 
radiation; 77 brain cancer patients at a hospital in Florida overdosed; 
36 cancer patients at a veterans hospital in New Jersey overdosed; 260 
patients at a hospital in Los Angeles who received eight times more 
radiation than designed.321 The reporters comprehensively studied just 
one state (New York), and found 621 documented mistakes between 
2001 and 2008, including 133 incidents of incorrectly shaped beams, 
284 incidents in which “radiation missed all or part of its intended 
target or treated the wrong body part entirely,” and 50 incidents in 
which “patients received radiation intended for someone else.”322 
These spot reports align with nationwide estimates that one in twenty 
radiation patients will suffer injury.323 
A hospital official at St. Vincent’s said the incident above “occurred 
as a result of a unique and unanticipated combination of issues.”324 But 
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it was neither unique nor unanticipated. These incidents, dating back 
to the Therac-25, largely germinate from two related sources: software 
failures and user errors. 
C. “To Really Screw Things Up, You Need a Computer” 
Old medical software problems still persist  serial system crashes, 
user impatience that leads to quick bypasses, user fatigue with error 
alerts, misplaced trust in the software, and utter disbelief that these 
technologically advanced, highly calibrated machines could err so 
badly.325 And as radiation technology becomes increasingly powerful, 
it requires more sophisticated software that itself requires more 
sophisticated users.326 The problems will compound. 
Hospitals and specialty practices can be quick to adopt new 
technologies. But they often do so without a corresponding increase in 
the personnel and resources required to use them properly. American 
medicine has long embraced unproven new technologies that are later 
shown to be ineffective, or worse, unsafe.327 But health providers are 
not solely to blame. As Einer Elhauge notes, technology excites us, 
and “[c]onsumers often irrationally demand new technologies that 
have no demonstrable benefit.”328 In short, health providers seem 
particularly susceptible to novelty, consumer demand, and 
manufacturer claims.329 We see glimpses of this in the exuberance over 
mobile health. 
When things do go wrong, responsibility dissipates. Providers blame 
manufacturers. Manufacturers blame user errors. Federal, state, and 
local regulators with overlapping jurisdiction remain inert. 
The one thing they have in common is overlooking the interaction 
between software and humans. Manufacturers often design software 
that is confusing or downright hostile to users. Software users do not 
always operate in ideal conditions. They might be harried, distracted, 
 
 325 On this latter point, St. Vincent’s Hospital in Manhattan was so dismissive that 
when the wife of the tongue cancer patient reported serious problems with her 
husband, it sent a psychiatrist to see her. See Bogdanich, Radiation Offers New Cures, 
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or frustrated, or some combination of the three. Regulators focus 
myopically on their own narrow sphere of jurisdiction  either the 
device itself or the licensed user  but rarely both. As the Institute of 
Medicine reminded us: “To Err Is Human.”330 But, as a federal official 
quipped during the FDA’s public workshop on medical apps, the 
subtitle to the Institute’s report should have been “To Really Screw 
Things up, You Need a Computer.”331 Another physician researcher 
testified at the workshop that errors and “never events” associated 
with software technologies are generally caused by design flaws, 
defective coding, interoperability conflicts, and user errors.332 
Some skeptics are sounding the alarm, requesting real data that 
mobile health applications actually do what they claim.333 As the 
researcher testified, “Like a lot of things in medicine, when you 
actually test it in a randomized controlled trial, you may find out it 
doesn’t work . . . Optimism is not a substitute for rigorous trials.”334 
This is precisely the FDA’s charge, and it is particularly important with 
new software technologies. 
We are dangerously predisposed to believe computers. We believe 
they are error-resistant, even infallible.335 And this mindset, known as 
“automation bias,” disarms us from critically evaluating potential 
errors.336 In fact, research demonstrates that we trust automation even 
when we suspect errors or malfunctions,337 a reality made crystalline 
by the radiation examples above. 
The allure of automation is that it represents rule-bounded, binary-
coded clarity. Automation has a reductionist allure  software at its 
core is ones and zeroes and nothing in between. But automated 
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systems are usually inaccessible and opaque to the non-programmer, 
which often “shields them from scrutiny.”338 Such scrutiny should 
come from the FDA. 
Indeed, the agency seems to be well aware of the dangers posed by 
computerized devices. In February 2010, the FDA revealed during a 
public meeting that it had received voluntary reports of 260 
malfunctions, 44 injuries, and six deaths related to health information 
technologies.339 Errors included mixing different patients’ data, 
accessing incorrect data, losing or corrupting data, errors in 
computing and analyzing data (like calculating wildly incorrect 
medication dosages), and compatibility errors between different types 
of software and computer systems.340 Because these were voluntary 
reports, and because even the FDA’s mandatory reporting 
requirements suffer from dramatic under-reporting,341 the real 
numbers are no doubt much higher. 
Unfortunately, the FDA’s posture towards software is reactive rather 
than proactive. To wit, FDA and local regulators confronted by the 
New York Times series on radiation mistakes opened subsequent 
investigations.342 
Mobile health applications, of course, are not yet capable of 
inflicting the “unspeakable pain” that radiation machines can.343 But as 
history demonstrates, medical software gradually becomes more 
ubiquitous and critical to patient safety, not less. 
Consider that device software currently struggles at even basic 
things, like keeping accurate time. A surprisingly large number of 
clocks used by medical devices and hospitals are wrong, sometimes by 
thirty minutes or more.344 A study by Julian Goldman reviewed the 
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clocks used by 1,700 medical devices.345 He found that only three 
percent of the clocks were within three seconds of actual time, and 20 
percent deviated by more than 30 minutes, with the average clock 24 
minutes off.346 The devices he studied were located in four prestigious 
east coast hospitals.347 
These types of time-keeping errors may seem trivial, but evidence 
suggests that they are both common and costly. In 2007, a researcher 
in Vienna studied 113 intensive care units in 27 countries, and found 
that almost half of all mistakes in administering intravenous drugs 
were timing errors.348 A simple solution has existed since 1985  
using a Network Time Protocol that cell phones use to synchronize 
time to atomic clocks.349 But the FDA has never required devices to 
use this technology.350 HHS has proposed regulations that would 
require it for electronic medical records, but they would not phase in 
until 2014.351 
As alluring as medical innovation is, it is not an unmitigated good. 
The role of regulators is to facilitate the benefits of new technologies 
and manage their risks. Doing so should support long-term markets 
for the technology, preserve consumer trust, and level the playing field 
among competitors. One goal of this Article is to push the FDA 
towards a regulatory feedback loop, in which the agency confronts 
broader, longstanding problems with software oversight and corrects 
them going forward, particularly as it oversees emerging technologies 
like mobile health. 
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CONCLUSION 
Rarely does a class of technologies excite physicians, patients, 
financeers, gadgeteers, and policymakers alike. But for mobile health 
to begin to reach its immense potential  saving millions of lives, 
cutting billions in spending, and democratizing medicine  federal 
regulators will have to provide meaningful oversight, ensuring that 
these technologies are safe and effective. For this to happen, the FDA 
will first have to confront its long history of piecemeal oversight of 
medical device software. If the FDA does so, it can enter a regulatory 
feedback loop, through which the agency can begin to craft 
enforceable policies that not only ensure the safety and efficacy of 
mobile health technologies, but also facilitate the long-term health of 
this promising market.352 
This Article tries to draw attention to the major legal and regulatory 
challenges presented by mobile health. Obviously, there are many 
more avenues of inquiry. For example, in the health policy literature 
alone, there are looming questions about how mobile health might 
disturb existing legal and regulatory frameworks governing how we 
finance, deliver, and measure the quality of care. There are also 
troubling questions, largely untouched here, about the lack of privacy 
and data security in mobile health applications, their integration with 
electronic health records, and the dangers of “big data” in the health 
care sphere.353 If the mobile health revolution has really begun, we 
must now grapple with it. 
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